## Keep KOHL'S Accountable

OUR SOLUTION FOR LONG-SUFFERING SHAREHOLDERS:
$\checkmark$ A RECONSTITUTED, QUALIFIED BOARD
$\checkmark$ A STRATEGIC OPERATING PLAN TO UNLOCK VALUE
$\checkmark$ A CLEAR, OBJECTIVE REVIEW OF STRATEGIC ALTERNATIVES

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## WHY WE ARE HERE: SWEEPING CHANGE IS NEEDED ATOP KOHL'S

## We believe the current Board...

X Has overseen a failed operating plan which has resulted in significant share loss and the latest 3-year plan appears no better

X Is entrenched and refused to add a meaningful shareholder for a second year
X Is running a sale process for optics sake when in fact, the Company is trying to retain control of the Board through the AGM

X Failed at capital allocation and balance optimization, leaving billions of owned real estate idling
$X$ Can not begin to fix problems they do not believe they have
X Has not aligned compensation with shareholders, as they have significantly rewarded executives for declining results

## WHY WE ARE HERE: OUR SLATE IS THE RIGHT SOLUTION AT THE RIGHT TIME

$\square$ Sorely needed ownership perspectives to bring a sense of urgency
$\square$ Significant consumer and retail sector expertise that can address market share losses and failed execution
$\square$ Strong M\&A and transaction expertise
( A viable plan for producing enhanced value on a standalone basis
$\square$ A vision for running a parallel review of alternatives that is credible and transparent

## ABOUT MACELLUM

## Macellum is a long-term holder, with ownership of nearly 5\% of Kohl's

## Firm Overview

- Founded in 2009 by Jonathan Duskin, Macellum Capital Management is an investment firm with deep expertise in the retail and consumer sectors
- Macellum invests in undervalued companies we believe can appreciate significantly as a result of a change in strategy or improvements in operations, capital allocation or corporate governance
- Macellum's campaign at Kohl's in 2021 saw two Macellum nominees appointed to the Board; however, we believe the Company's continued underperformance signals that more meaningful change and shareholder representation is needed in the boardroom


## Proven Track Record of Creating Value at Large, Public Retailers

## BIG LOTS

$\checkmark$ Three new directors
$\checkmark$ Sold $\sim \$ 725$ million of owned real estate $\checkmark$ Meaningful stock repurchase
$\checkmark$ Formation of capital allocation committee

$\checkmark$ Nine new directors
$\checkmark$ New management team $\checkmark$ Sold non-core assets worth $\sim 75 \%$ of company's market capitalization

## CITIT RENDS

$\checkmark$ Five new directors
$\checkmark$ New management team $\checkmark$ Company projected to earn 375\%+ more in 2022 vs. prior to campaign launch

## ABOUT KOHL'S

## Kohl's can be a source of tremendous value if it has a Board with the right leadership and plan

## BUSINESS SUMMARY

- Kohl's is an omnichannel retailer focused on apparel, footwear and accessories for women, men and children
- Kohl's also sells soft home products including bedsheets, pillows and housewares targeted to middle-income customers across the U.S.
- The Company currently operates $\mathbf{1 , 1 5 0 +}$ stores nationwide with $\sim \mathbf{1 0 0 , 0 0 0}$ associates and 65 million+ customers
- Kohl's' strategy is now focused on active and casual wear and smaller format stores backed by high-profile partnerships with Sephora, Amazon, etc.


## COMPANY SNAPSHOT

- Founded: 1962
- Went Public: 1992
- Headquarters: Menomonee Falls, WI
- Share Price: \$47.77
- Market Capitalization: $\$ 7.191$ billion
- FY 2021 Free Cash Flow: $\$ 1.56$ billion
- FY 2021 Total Revenue: $\$ 19.43$ billion (2.7\% decrease from FY 2019)

Source: Company 10-K; Company's share price and market capitalization as of 01/14/22.

| SALES HAVE STAGNATED WHILE OPERATING PROFIT HAS DECLINED |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 | 2015 | 2016 | 2017 | 2018 | 2019 | 2020 | 2021 | Change |
| Same-Store Sales | 0.5\% | 0.3\% | (1.2\%) | (0.3\%) | 0.7\% | (2.4\%) | 1.5\% | 1.7\% | (1.3\%) | (20.4\%) | 22.9\% | (3\%) ${ }^{1}$ |
| Gross Margin \% | 38.2\% | 36.3\% | 36.5\% | 36.3\% | 36.0\% | 35.9\% | 36.0\% | 36.4\% | 35.7\% | 31.1\% | 38.1\% | (8bps) |
| EBIT | \$2,158 | \$1,890 | \$1,742 | \$1,689 | \$1,553 | \$1,369 | \$1,416 | \$1,465 | \$1,212 | (\$300) | \$1,680 | (\$478) |
| EBIT Margin \% ${ }^{2}$ | 11.5\% | 9.8\% | 9.2\% | 8.5\% | 7.7\% | 7.0\% | 7.1\% | 7.2\% | 6.1\% | (1.9\%) | 8.6\% | (283bps) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | Total |
| Capital Expenditures | \$927 | \$785 | \$643 | \$682 | \$690 | \$768 | \$672 | \$578 | \$855 | \$334 | \$605 | \$7,539 |

## KOHL'S DECADE OF MARKET SHARE LOSSES



Source: Company SEC Filings, US Census Bureau, Bloombers LP


## ANOTHER WASTED YEAR FOLLOWING A LOST DECADE

Kohl's' shares have underperformed relevant peers and indices over every applicable time horizon

SINCE PRE-COVID (12/31/2019) TSR


5-YEAR TSR


3-YEAR TSR


10-YEAR TSR


## THE CURRENT BOARD HAS LOST CREDIBILITY



THE BOARD HAS OVERSEEN SEVERAL PLANS THAT HAVE FAILED TO CREATE VALUE

## THE CURRENT BOARD HAS LOST CREDIBILITY (CONT.)

Poor Governance and Oversight

REFUSAL TO ADOPT UNIVERSAL PROXY CARD


POOR EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION POLICIES

IMPLEMENTATION OF TWOTIERED POISON PILL


LACK OF DIVERSITY AT EXECUTIVE LEVEL


OPAQUE STRATEGIC ALTERNATIVES REVIEW PROCESS

INEFFECTIVE CAPITAL
ALLOCATION POLICY


## THE CURRENT BOARD HAS LOST CREDIBILITY (CONT.)

## Kohl's has misrepresented several key facts pertaining to its performance and Macellum's campaign for change

x MYTH: Kohl's stated that its March 7 investor day was "well-received"
x MYTH: The Board claims its "winning strategy and skilled Board are maximizing value for all shareholders"
x MYTH: The Board claims its sale process is "robust" and that it "is committed to evaluating all opportunities to increase shareholder value"
x MYTH: Kohl's has unfairly attacked our nominees' qualifications
x MYTH: Kohl's has misconstrued Macellum's intentions and plans for the Company
$\checkmark \quad$ THE REALITY: The Company's much-touted analyst day and the release of yet another standalone strategy were met with a roughly $13 \%$ share price decline. The Board is championing a three-year plan, that in our view, is overly capital-intensive and risky and only appears to derive EPS growth from share repurchases as EBIT is down roughly $11 \%$ at the midpoint from 2021.
$\checkmark$ THE REALITY: The Company's total shareholder returns have lagged relevant peers and indices over every germane time horizon
$\checkmark \quad$ THE REALITY: We believe Kohl's has run a flawed and opaque review of strategic alternatives, including rejecting indications of interest from credible, well-capitalized acquirers before apparently providing sufficient access and information, implementing a poison pill that seems designed to chill acquirers' interest and providing insufficient transparency ahead of the annual meeting
$\checkmark$ THE REALITY: Our slate has the right mix of corporate governance acumen, consumer and retail expertise, mergers and acquisitions experience and independent ownership perspectives to fix Kohl's
$\checkmark$ THE REALITY: Macellum believes the majority of the Board needs to be refreshed so a robust sale process can occur and be objectively weighed against the Company's internal plans to create shareholder value

## NEW 3-YEAR PLAN WOULD RESULT IN EBIT DECLINES AND HAS MEANINGFUL RISK

## Kohl's stock dropped 13\% the day of its analyst day and release of the 3-year plan

## Disappointing Investor Day¹

- Kohl's 3-year plan resulted in analyst projecting a 19\% decline in EBIT from 2021
- Further, the plan is inherently risky as it calls for increasing SGA, capital expenditure and inventory
- To achieve this plan Kohl's needs to have revenue growth
- Kohl's has been unable grow sales for a decade despite a multitude of initiatives like Amazon as well as the addition of many brands such as Nike, Under Armour, Tommy Hilfiger, Calvin Klein and Land's End

The 3-year plan is unlikely to result in a stock price close to the reported offer prices

- Kohl's "unaffected price", prior to reported offers was $\$ 46.84$ Arguably, the unaffected price would be lower when accounting for investors' reaction to the 3-year plan
- With the stock trading $15 \%$ below reported offers if would appears investors have little confidence in the process
- Kohl's stock price is likely to revert to levels below $\$ 46$ if a sale does not occur or a majority of the Board is not replaced

Estimated Cumulative CapEx vs. Annual EBIT (\$s in millions)


## EVEN IF KOHL'S HITS ITS TARGETS, THE STOCK WILL LIKELY NOT ACHIEVE REPORTED OFFER PRICES

## And under many scenarios, Kohl's could be substantially lower

- Kohl's, on an unaffected basis, was trading at a $6.5 \times \mathrm{P} / \mathrm{E}$. Given the negligible operating improvements implied by the three-year plan, that is unlikely to change
- At 6.5x P/E, Kohl's' price target at the midpoint of the Company's guidance in 2024 would be $\$ 53$. Giving Kohl's the benefit of the 5 -year average P/E of $8.5 x$, the price target could be $\sim \$ 70$ in three years
- However, we believe there is material risk to Kohl's' plan given the significant SG\&A, inventory and capex growth. If sales growth does not materialize - which it has not for a decade - earnings could be $\$ 5.64$ a share
- We believe rejecting offers under the current plan and without changing the majority of the Board poses substantial risk to shareholders

| Kohl's EPS 2024 Targets |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Mid-point | \$8.20 |  |  |
| Risk Scenario: Flat Sales ${ }^{1}$ | \$5.64 |  |  |
| 2024 Price Targets @ Current Multiple |  |  |  |
|  | 6.0x | 6.5x | 7.0x |
| Mid-point | \$49.20 | \$53.30 | \$57.40 |
| Risk Scenario: Flat Sales | \$33.84 | \$36.66 | \$39.48 |
| \% Change Compared to $\$ 70^{2}$ Bid |  |  |  |
|  | 6.0x | 6.5x | 7.0x |
| Mid-point | (30\%) | (24\%) | (18\%) |
| Risk Scenario: Flat Sales | (52\%) | (48\%) | (44\%) |
| 2024 Price Targets @ Historic Multiple |  |  |  |
|  | 8.0x | 8.5x | 9.0x |
| Mid-point | \$65.60 | \$69.70 | \$73.80 |
| Risk Scenario: Flat Sales | \$45.12 | \$47.94 | \$50.76 |
| \% Change Compared to \$70 Bid |  |  |  |
|  | 8.0x | 8.5x | 9.0x |
| Mid-point | (6\%) | (0\%) | 5\% |
| Risk Scenario: Flat Sales | (36\%) | (32\%) | (27\%) |

[^0]
## THE "NEW STRATEGY" IS MORE OF THE SAME

## Ms. Gass was the architect of the "Greatness Agenda" in 2014, and in recent years, little has changed with the strategy or the stock price

- In October 2014, Kohl's announced its "Greatness Agenda", which failed to even come close to meeting its targets or creating shareholder value
- In 2018, with Ms. Gass as CEO, Kohl's recommitted to the "key pillars of the Greatness Agenda"
- After material profit declines throughout 2019 (and after the pandemic), Kohl's announced a "new" strategic plan in Oct 2020 that would have shareholders believe it's finally on the right track
- 18 months later, in March of 2022, as the stock experience material underperformance, Kohl's announced its "reinvention" plan
- Unfortunately, we've heard this story before. Most of the current initiatives are strikingly similar to the prior ones from the failed "Greatness Agenda"
- The latest plan embeds EBIT declines and delivers EPS growth only through using shareholder capital to repurchase stock.


## 2014



2020


2022

Kohl's Reinvention is Driving Growth for the Future


## THE CURRENT STRATEGIC REVIEW DOES NOT APPEAR TO BE CREDIBLE

## REUTERS

By Svea Herbst-Beyliss
v 1 目 $e$ ロ

At least three interested parties, including luxury department store operator Hudson's Bay Company, private equity firm Sycamore Partners and a group that includes Acacia Research Corp (ACTG.O), a holding company for business controlled by activist hedge fund Starboard Value LP, have made bids for Kohl's, which is valued at $\$ 7.8$ billion, sources said. Some have offered to pay as much as $\$ 70$ a share, the sources said.

Several bidders expressed concerns about the speed of the sale process and their ability to access information for diligence purposes, the sources added.

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MILWAUKEE
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## (3) By Rich Kirchen - Senior Reporter, Milwaukee Business Journal

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BUSNESS JOURNAL
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The board of Kohl's argues that it has overseen a fundamental transformation of the business under CEO Michelle Gass that will accelerate the retailer's growth and profitability. Meanwhile, the company continues a "robust and intentional process to evaluate potential bids," the letter said.

The letter doesn't provide a specific update on a process Kohl's announced Feb. 4 that entails investment bank Goldman Sachs both fielding incoming inquiries from suitors and contacting prospective interested parties.

## yahoo! <br> finance

Brian Sozzi • Anchor, Editor-at-Large
Ii March $25,2022 \cdot 4$ min read

As for long-term guidance, Kohl's sees low-single digit percentage sales growth and mid- to high-single digit EPS growth.

Kohl's shares promptly crashed $12 \%$ on its March 7 investor day.
Perhaps realizing it made an execution mistake in handling credible deal offers, Kohl's issued yet another press release.
"The Board acknowledged receipt of multiple preliminary indications of interest. The proposals received are non-binding and without committed financing," Kohl's said in a March 21 statement.

Source: Company SEC Filings, Bloomberg LP

Kohl's Unlikely to Complete Auction Ahead of Director Contest


## LEWYORKPOST

By Lisa Fickenscher
March 21, 2022 |2:24pm | Updated
Kohl's rejected two acquisition offers earlier this year, including one from Sycamore, and then implemented a so-called "poison pill" to fend off a hostile takeover.

- KSS - Filed Updated Proxy w/transcript of a video CEO Gass sent to KSS employees yesterday. Gass noted in those comments that GS has "engaged w/>25 parties" (this is an increased from the $>20$ commentary in $3 / 7$ proxy). As expected, Gass also said a) "We've now moved onto the next phase where we've asked selected bidders to further refine their offers and to secure financing. They are doing a lot of diligence and homework, and we have provided access to thousands of documents and lots of data to help facilitate this process-all of which is a very normal part of vetting." \& b) (emphasis in the proxy, not added by me) "But let me be clear - this does not necessarily mean we are selling the company, and no decisions have been made at this time. The board is doing its job in representing our shareholders to evaluate alternatives and other options - and all of those explorations are being held up against the current strategy that we're executing. The plan we're executing is very. powerful and it will deliver substantial value to our shareholders - so that's a high bar that the board is looking at when evaluating these alternatives."


## INDICATIVE TIMETABLE OF A SALE PROCESS WOULD POINT TO SUFFICIENT TIME TO CONSUMATE A TRANSACTION

It appears to us that the process has been designed to provide the illusion of a sale process only to give incumbent directors the aircover to say the process is on-going and should not be disrupted by the addition of new directors

If this Board retains control, we doubt a fair and transparent sale process will continue

Illustrative Strategic Alternatives Process



IN OUR VIEW, THE BOARD COULD HAVE DELAYED THE AGM UNTIL JULY TO PROVIDE FOR A FULL AND ROBUST PROCESS, BUT HAVE OPTED NOT TO

[^1]
## KOHL'S IS AT A FORK IN THE ROAD

We believe substantial and urgent change is clearly needed - or else value will be permanently impaired

One year following Macellum's campaign for incremental change on the Board, Kohl's has failed to create value for shareholders and experienced meaningful underperformance

After a decade of disappointing operating results and stock performance Kohl's has one of the lowest valuations among its retail peers and was unable to present a compelling plan to investors at its analyst day

Now, Kohl's has an opportunity to pursue value-maximizing acquisition proposals - a window that will likely not be open indefinitely as the market environment and macro circumstances evolve

## WE FIRMLY BELIEVE A SALE OR MAJORITY BOARD CHANGE IS URGENTLY NEEDED BEFORE KOHL'S POTENTIALLY REACHES A POINT WHERE MARKET SHARE LOSSES BECOME IRREVERSIBLE

## OUR SLATE

We assembled a slate with the experience, expertise and ownership mentality required to deliver the long-term, value-enhancing change that Kohl's needs


## GEORGE

 BROKAW$\checkmark$ Capital Markets Acumen Deep knowledge of both the public and private markets
$\checkmark$ M\&A Experience
Strong investment banking background in assessing and executing successful transactions
$\checkmark$ Public Board Experience Director of DISH Network Corporation (NASDAQ: DISH), CTO Realty Growth, Inc. (NYSE: CTO) and Alico, Inc. (NASDAQ: ALCO)


## JONATHAN

 DUSKIN$\checkmark$ Sector Expertise More than 20 years of experience investing in retail and consumer sectors and currently serves as a director of Citi Trends, Inc. (NASDAQ: CTRN)
$\checkmark$ M\&A Experience Proven investment banker at Lehman Brothers Inc.
$\checkmark$ Ownership Perspective Long-term, significant shareholder of Kohl's


FRANCIS KEN DUANE
$\checkmark$ Sector Expertise Deep experience growing revenue streams, developing strategic plans and overseeing operations at global retailers
$\checkmark$ M\&A Experience Led transformational and bolt-on mergers and acquisitions at PVH Corp. (NYSE: PVH)
$\checkmark \quad$ C-Suite Experience More than three decades of experience leading public retailers


PAMELA J. EDWARDS
$\checkmark$ Sector Expertise Extensive executive-level experience across a variety of retail brands and sectors
$\checkmark$ Business \& Financial Planning Expertise Chief Financial Officer of Citi Trends, Inc. (NASDAQ: CTRN) with strong background in finance, strategy and operations
$\checkmark$ Relevant Board Experience
Director and Audit Committee member of Neiman Marcus Group, LLC


STACY HAWKINS
$\checkmark$ Public Company Governance Acumen Strong knowledge of public company governance practices and executive compensation policies
$\checkmark$ Legal Expertise Vice Dean of Rutgers Law School, the largest public law school in the Northeast
$\checkmark$ Diversity Counseling Expertise
Has helped several companies across multiple sectors improve diversity initiatives

## OUR SLATE (CONT.)

We assembled a slate with the experience, expertise and ownership mentality required to deliver the long-term, value-enhancing change that Kohl's needs


## JEFFREY A.

 KANTOR$\checkmark$ Sector Expertise Nearly 40 years of experience overseeing merchandising, planning, private label development, and ecommerce
$\checkmark \quad$ Public Co. Executive Experience Former Chief Merchandising Officer and Chief Stores Officer at Macy's Inc. (NYSE: M)
$\checkmark$ Consulting \& Advisory Skills
Consultant focused on retail and wholesale business strategy


PERRY M. MANDARINO
$\checkmark$ Sector Expertise Deep experience advising stakeholders on business and financial strategy across retail, consumer and other industries
$\checkmark$ M\&A Experience Strong investment banking background with experience advising buyers and sellers of 30+ retailers with billions of dollars in revenue and value
$\checkmark$ Public Board Experience Director of bebe stores, inc. (OTCMKTS: BEBE)


## CYNTHIA S.

 MURRAY$\checkmark$ Sector Expertise Extensive experience in retail and women's apparel sector, including President of Chico's Brand, FAS, Inc. (NYSE: CHS) \& Full Beauty Brands
$\checkmark \quad$ Strategic Expertise $35+$ years of experience leading business turnarounds, share price growth and long-term strategy
$\checkmark$ Relevant Board
Experience
Director of Francesca's Collections prior to its 2011


CRAIG M. YOUNG
$\checkmark$ Capital Markets Acumen Extensive experience evaluating sale opportunities and companies' strategies and financial operations
$\checkmark$ M\&A Experience Strong private equity background assessing and executing successful transactions
$\checkmark$ Real Estate Expertise Deep knowledge of real estate investment and property development

## OVERVIEW: STANDALONE PLAN PILLARS

With a materially refreshed Board that includes sector expertise and shareholder perspectives, we believe Kohl's can achieve significantly better results

## MEANINGFULLY GROW

 SALES

IMPROVE CAPITAL
ALIGN EXECUTIVE
ALLOCATION
COMPENSATION

## OVERVIEW: OUR VISION FOR IMPROVING KOHL'S

Our slate would assess all paths to maximizing shareholder value, including sale opportunities versus a new strategic plan for pursuing market share and earnings growth

## Operational

$\checkmark$ Culture of strong execution
$\checkmark$ Clear, streamlined value proposition
$\checkmark$ Fast and nimble merchandising
$\checkmark$ Balanced merchandise assortment
$\checkmark$ Efficient direct sourcing and distribution rationalization
$\checkmark$ Zero based cost budgeting
$\checkmark$ Aligned executive compensation with shareholder value creation

## Financial \& Strategic

$\checkmark$ A more open and transparent review of strategic alternatives
$\checkmark$ Larger share repurchases
$\checkmark$ Evaluate sale-leaseback of real estate
$\checkmark$ Seamless ecommerce operations

SIGNIFICANT SHAREHOLDER-DRIVEN CHANGE IS WARRANTED

## KOHL'S HAS TREMENDOUS VALUE CREATION POTENTIAL

Macellum 3-YR Plan with a Sale Leaseback




## IF YOU INVESTED \$100 IN KOHL’S 10 YEARS AGO...


....IT WOULD BE WORTH ABOUT THE SAME AMOUNT TODAY

## LOOKING AT KOHL'S PERFORMANCE PRE-COVID NEUTRALIZES THE POST-COVID "MOMENTUM"

We contend Kohl's' strategy has underwhelmed and will not lead to meaningful value creation for shareholders in the future



KOHL'S HAS UNDERPERFORMED DEPARTMENT STORE PEERS SINCE ITS OCTOBER 2020 ANALYST DAY

## IS KOHL'S' STRATEGIC PLAN ALSO RESPONSIBLE FOR DILLARD'S' (+373\%) AND MACY'S' (+276\%) STRONG PERFORMANCE?

## PERSISTENT INABILITY TO GROW SALES REVERSE OPERATING PROFIT DECLINE <br> Macellum believes these problems are solvable but require a Board with relevant expertise and experience that will hold management accountable



THE BOARD HAS OVERSEEN A 22\% DECLINE IN EBIT AND LONG-TERM OPERATING UNDERPERFORMANCE OVER THE PAST 10 FISCAL YEARS

## SALES HAVE STAGNATED FOR YEARS

Over the last 10 years, Kohl's' merchandise sales have not grown despite an increase in sales due to the pandemic and the significant opportunity to gain market share driven by competitors' store closures

Merchandise Sales (\$ in Millions) and Same Store Sales (FY 2011 - FY 2021)


## KOHL'S FAILED TO CAPTURE \$26.4 BILLION IN AVAILABLE SALES OVER THE LAST FIVE YEARS AS OTHER RETAILERS HAVE GONE BANKRUPT¹

## AS THE ECOMONY REOPENED, KOHL'S LOST MARKET SHARE TO PEERS AS TRENDS DETERIORATED

We believe that management is often overoptimistic and does not have a handle on the business


|  | $\begin{gathered} \text { Q1 v } 19 \\ \text { Act. } \end{gathered}$ | $\text { Q2 v } 19$ <br> Act. | $\text { Q3 v } 19$ Act. | $\begin{gathered} \text { Q4 v } 19 \\ \text { Act. } \end{gathered}$ | FY 21 vs. 19 Act. |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| AEO | 17\% | 15\% | 19\% | 15\% | 16\% |
| BBBY* | 3\% | (1\%) | (4\%) | (8\%) | (8\%) |
| BKE | 49\% | 45\% | 43\% | 41\% | 44\% |
| BURL | 34\% | 33\% | 29\% | 18\% | 28\% |
| CTRN | 39\% | 30\% | 24\% | 14\% | 27\% |
| DDS | (9\%) | 12\% | 5\% | 12\% | 7\% |
| DKS | 52\% | 45\% | 40\% | 28\% | 40\% |
| GPS | 8\% | 5\% | (1\%) | (3\%) | 2\% |
| HIBB | 48\% | 66\% | 39\% | 22\% | 43\% |
| JWN | (13\%) | 6\% | (1\%) | (1\%) | (2\%) |
| M* | (10\%) | 6\% | 9\% | 6\% | 3\% |
| PLCE | 6\% | (2\%) | 6\% | (1\%) | 2\% |
| ROST | 19\% | 21\% | 19\% | 14\% | 18\% |
| TGT (EX FOOD, 80\%) | 37\% | 37\% | 37\% | 32\% | 36\% |
| TJX | 9\% | 23\% | 20\% | 14\% | 16\% |
| URBN | 7\% | 20\% | 15\% | 14\% | 14\% |
| WSM | 41\% | 42\% | 42\% | 36\% | 40\% |
| Retail Peer Average | 20\% | 24\% | 20\% | 15\% | 19\% |
| Retail Peer Median | 17\% | 21\% | 19\% | 14\% | 16\% |
| KSS | (4\%) | 1\% | 0\% | (5\%) | (2\%) |

## WE CONTEND OPERATIONAL \& STRATEGIC MISSTEPS HAVE CAUSED MARKET SHARE LOSSES

Kohl's' market share losses are not a new phenomenon; over the past 10 years, the broader industry has grown 42\% while Kohl's has fallen behind


## SALES HAVE DECLINED DESPITE A SIGNIFICANT OPPORTUNITY TO SEIZE MARKET SHARE

Kohl's' sales have not grown despite the multibillion-dollar market share gap left from other retailers entering bankruptcy

"[...] as you just said, the marketplace is changing. We're staying very close in making sure that we can lean into those market share opportunities and take advantage. And we do feel like we're in a strong position to capture market share.

CEO Michelle Gass on
March 19, 2021, Q1 2021 Analyst Call

## FAILED TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF AN ~\$26.4B OPPORTUNITY

## FAILURE TO INCREASE GROSS MARGIN SINCE 2011

## The Company has been targeting gross margin growth since 2014 without success

- In February 2014, Kohl's began targeting a 38\% gross margin. While the Company did achieve this target in 2021 due to a lack of inventory and related markdowns, Kohl's is already taking a step backward and has reduced expectations for 2022 with guidance for gross margin contraction ${ }^{1}$
- Implicitly acknowledging 2021 experienced one-time benefits
"While we will benefit from

Merchandise Gross Margin \%

our ongoing sourcing initiatives and some pricing actions, we do not expect to fully mitigate the headwinds. As a result, we
are planning gross margin to contract by approximately 100 basis points in 2022 relative to 2021."

- CFO Jill Timm on March 1st, 2022, Q4 Analyst Call


## FULFILLMENT COSTS ARE UP SIGNIFICANTLY WHILE SALES HAVE DECLINED

Kohl's increased distribution center capacity significantly while sales declined and 30\% migrated online. As a result, Kohl's runs a DC network that is materially under optimized and inefficient

DC \& FC AREA (MILLION SQ. FT.)


TOTAL REVENUE / TOTAL DC\& FC SQ. FT. (\$)


## DESPITE GROSS MARGIN GROWTH FROM 2019, KOHL'S HAS STILL TRAILED RETAIL PEERS



## SG\&A GROWTH GROWTH

## HAS OUTPACED

REVENUE

Kohl's SG\&A as a percentage of sales is projected to grow ~199 basis points to $29.4 \%$ in 2022, the Company has deleveraged SG\&A since 2017 and consensus and guidance show this growth will continue

Total SG\&A as a \% of Revenue


What management is saying: "I think what I would tell you, as you know, it's core to us to have a strong, costdisciplined culture. We've been talking about operational excellence for several years. And I think you know, if you look back over time, our SG\&A growth rate has been around a 1.5\% CAGR because we manage it so tightly."

- Jill Timm, CFO 8/18/2020

SG\&A AS A PERCENTAGE OF REVENUE IS EXPECTED TO EXPAND +199 BASIS POINTS FROM 2017 - 2022E

## DECLINING SALES AND DELEVERAGING HAVE RESULTED IN A MATERIAL DROP IN EBIT

Kohl's' EBIT has steadily declined 22\% over the last decade - while management claims its "strategy is improving profitability"1

Further, EBIT Dollars are expected to decline \$716 million or $33 \%$ by the end of 2022


2022 EBIT IS ONLY EXPECTED TO RETURN TO 2018 LEVELS, THE YEAR MS. GASS BECAME CEO

## EBIT HAS NOT ONLY DECLINED BUT ALSO SIGNIFICANTLY TRAILED PEERS

Kohl's' EBIT decline contrasts to material growth in peers' EBIT over the last decade and since before the pandemic started

|  | EBIT, Adj. |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | Growth | Growth |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 | 2015 | 2016 | 2017 | 2018 | 2019 | 2020 | 2021 | FY 11 vs. 21A | FY 19 vs. 21A |
| Retail Peer Average | 5\% | 21\% | 9\% | 0\% | 5\% | (4\%) | (2\%) | (1\%) | (7\%) | (2\%) | 392\% | 128\% | 149\% |
| Retail Peer Median | 12\% | 17\% | 5\% | 2\% | (1\%) | (6\%) | (2\%) | (3\%) | (4\%) | 35\% | 146\% | 119\% | 97\% |
| Compensation Peer Group Average | 8\% | 20\% | 6\% | 4\% | (8\%) | (7\%) | 4\% | (2\%) | (11\%) | (116\%) | 510\% | 21\% | 130\% |
| KSS | 2,158 | 1,889 | 1,742 | 1,689 | 1,553 | 1,368 | 1,416 | 1,465 | 1,212 | (300) | 1,680 | (22\%) | 39\% |
|  | 3\% | (12\%) | (8\%) | (3\%) | (8\%) | (12\%) | 4\% | 3\% | (17\%) | NM | NM |  |  |

## MATERIAL CAPITAL EXPENDITURES HAVE NOT BENEFITED EBT

Kohl's has spent a cumulative $\$ 7.5$ billion in CapEx since 2011 and is projected to spend a total of $\$ 8.4$ billion by 2022. EBT has decreased 24\% since 2011 and is projected to fall by 39\% through 2022


[^2]
## A HISTORY OF OVERLY OPTIMISTIC PROGNOSTICATIONS THAT DON'T MATERIALIZE

"Our ongoing focus on the key pillars of our Greatness Agenda and our 2 key priorities of driving traffic and operational excellence continue to deliver strong momentum across the business. I am confident that the strategies we have in place, along with an organization
Michelle D. Gass Kohls Corporation - CEO \& Director that is operating with great speed, agility and innovation, will position us for long-term sustainable growth."

- Michelle Gass, CEO (August 21, 2018)


## AS RECENTLY AS 2018, KOHL'S WAS STILL RELYING ON THE <br> "GREATNESS AGENDA" PIONEERED BY MICHELLE GASS

## SHORTLY AFTER MAKING THESE BOLD CLAIMS, KOHL'S BEGAN TO MISS THE NUMBERS

## EDITED TRANSCRIPT

$$
\text { EVENT DATE } /_{\text {Bruce }}^{\text {H. Besanko Kohls Corporation -Cra }}
$$

OVERVIEW:
conference call participants
 in Kohl's other filings wwith the sEC, al of which are expressly incorporated herein by reference. Also, please note that replays of this fecording will

## STRATEGIC DÉJÀ VU - THE BOARD HAS OVERSEEN THE SAME STRATEGY SINCE 2014 WITH NO GAINS

"Now let me go into more detail around our key initiatives to drive top line growth beginning with product. As I referenced earlier, our vision is to be the most trusted retailer of choice for the active and casual lifestyle."

- Michelle Gass, CEO (November 17, 2020)
"...bolder pivot to be more relevant and repositioning the company from a department store to a focused lifestyle concept. All focus on how people are living today and tomorrow more actively and casually. ... I'm really excited about where this company is going, and we have a compelling vision to be the most trusted retailer of choice for the active and casual lifestyle."
- Michelle Gass, CEO (March 7, 2022)


## 2020



2022


## WHY WILL THE FOCUS ON ACTIVE WEAR WORK THIS TIME?

Despite identifying Active as a potential sales driver over eight years ago, total sales have remained stagnant as the category has not made a significant enough contribution to generate overall topline growth

Active is a tactical trend, not a strategy. Kohl's has stores over $70,000 \mathrm{sq} \mathrm{ft}$. that, in our view, need to cater to all parts of customers' lives. This is particularly evident as the effects of the pandemic dissipate and customers increasingly want to dress up and return to work wear
"Kohl's is uniquely positioned to be the retailer of choice for the active and casual lifestyle for the entire family with our accessible and aspirational brand portfolio, seamless omnichannel experience, and industryleading loyalty program. We are leaning into categories where we have demonstrated momentum and will drive more growth opportunities into the future. The recent environment has accelerated our path forward and presented a unique opportunity to capture market share from retail industry disruption."

- Michelle Gass, CEO October 20, 2020


In March 2019, management touted the Company's path to improving sales growth, only to turn around two-and-a-half months later and report the worst same-store sales results in the last 11 quarters

MARCH 5, 2019
"Our strong performance reflects the compelling product offering, great marketing strategy and consistent execution in stores and online... We are working from a position of strength, and as we look ahead, we are guiding to another year of positive sales growth and improved profitability. We will continue to work with speed and agility while also remaining disciplined and thoughtful in our efforts to drive stakeholder value."

- Michelle Gass, CEO (March 5, 2019)

MAY 21, 2019
"The first quarter featured a lot of volatility, with February being particularly tough. And while March and April trends did improve, they were below our expectation. This is reflected in our Q1 comparable sales decline of 3.4\%. While we are disappointed in our sales performance, the team was agile and reacted appropriately by managing expenses while continuing to invest in future growth. It's a highly competitive market, and we've seen more aggressive pricing and promotion in categories like Home. Looking ahead, we plan to be more aggressive in driving top-line sales to regain our momentum and grow market share."

- Michelle Gass, CEO (May 21, 2019)


# MISSING PROJECTIONS WITHIN SUCH A SHORT PERIOD OF TIME LEADS INVESTORS TO WONDER IF MANAGEMENT HAS A GRASP ON THE BUSINESS 

## MANAGEMENT HAS HISTORICALLY OVERPROMISED (CONT.)

Kohl's could not get back to its 2019 numbers despite management's continued claim of how well the Company was positioned for topline growth

After these optimistic proclamations, Kohl's experienced one of the worst sales performances compared to its retail peers and failed to achieve sales figures above 2019 levels
"But I also feel confident that everything we've outlined today should help us continue to grow the top line beyond 2019, and that will provide a much more efficient model."

Jill Timm, CFO (March 9, 2021)
"We continue to believe we are set up for a multi-year improvement in sales."

- Michelle Gass, CEO (May 20, 2021)


## COMPARISON OF FINANCIAL GOALS FROM EACH "NEW" STRATEGIC PLAN

| Goals of 2014 "Greatness Agenda" | Goals of 2020 Plan | Goals of 2022 Plan |
| :---: | :---: | :---: |
| - Sales \$21 Billion <br> - Operating Margin 9\% <br> - Operating Profit \$1.9 Billion | - Sales "Unknown" <br> - Operating Margin 7-8\% <br> - Operating Profit "Unknown" | - Low-Single-Digit Sales Growth <br> - Operating Margin 7-8\% <br> - Operating Profit $\$ 1,494^{1}$ <br> - EPS Growth Mid-to-High Single Digits ${ }^{2}$ |

THE 2022 PLAN HAS EBIT DOLLARS 11\% BELOW 2021 ACTUAL AND 23\% BELOW KOHL'S' "GREATNESS AGENDA" TARGET

## WE BELIEVE THAT KOHL'S' PLAN, IN THE ABSENCE OF SHARE REPURCHASES, WILL RESULT IN DECLINING EARNINGS

Kohl's 3-YR Plan Without Additional Share
Repurchases


- During its 2022 Analyst Day, Kohl's outlined its long-term financial plan, which includes low-single digital sales growth driven by $\$ 2.5$ bn in capital expenditures.
- However, Kohl's' plan includes both gross margin and interest deleverage
- As such, the Company's plan implies EBIT down $11 \%$ at the midpoint
- Net-net, excluding the $\$ 1$ billion of expected share repurchases in 2022, the midpoint of EPS would be down 3\% vs. 2021 actuals

KOHL'S' PLAN IS FOR MODEST SALES GROWTH AND A 11\% DECLINE IN EBIT FROM 2011 - IF YOU REMOVE SHARE REPURCHASES, THE PLAN ACTUALLY CALLS FOR EARNINGS TO DECLINE 3\%

## KOHL'S DOES NOT APPEAR TO INCREASE OPERATING INCOME

Kohl's 3-YR Plan With Additional Share Repurchases


- Kohl's 3-YR plan implies roughly $\$ 8.22$ in EPS at the midpoint in 2024
- Even with $\sim \$ 1.12$ in earnings growth from share repurchases, 12\% earnings growth over three years is a disappointing outcome for shareholders

KOHL'S' PLAN CALLS FOR OVER 100\% OF EPS GROWTH TO BE DRIVEN BY SHARE REPURCHASES

## KOHL'S PLANS TO SPEND \$2.5 BILLION+ ON CAPEX THROUGH 2024 WHILE CONSENSUS (19\%) AND GUIDED EBIT (11\%) ARE EXPECTED TO DECREASE

Kohl's plans to spend $\sim \$ 2.5$ billion on cumulative CapEx through the end of 2024 and guidance has resulted in EBIT estimates decreasing 19\%, or $\$ 320$ million, over the same period


## INVESTORS CANNOT HOPE THAT KOHL'S' CURRENT 3-YEAR PLAN IS CONSERATIVE

Prior to the unpredictable tailwinds of the economy reopening that enabled all retail peers to exceed their initial guidance, Kohl's was unable to accurately plan the business and guide investors

- FY 2020 guidance, given before the start of COVID, was 26\% below initial FY 2019 guidance and 21\% below FY 2018 actuals

EPS Guidance


[^3]
## WE BELIEVE DECLINING PERFORMANCE \& LACK OF CREDIBILITY HAVE RESULTED IN INDUSTRY-LOW VALUATION

Under the current Board, Kohl's' valuation has contracted meaningfully versus relevant peers - now delivering one of the worst valuations in retail - which we believe is due to a lack of market confidence in its execution and governance

EV / CY 2022 EBITDA (Based on Consensus EBITDA Estimates)


## SINCE OUR CAMPAIGN LAST YEAR, KOHL'S' VALUATION HAS CONTRACTED

Not only is the Company's valuation the lowest among its peers, but Kohl's valuation has also deteriorated meaningfully over the last year as investors appear to be losing confidence in the future

|  | Valuation 12/31/2020 EV/EBITDA |  | Valuation Current EV/EBITDA |  | \% Change 12/31/2020 vs. Current EV/EBITDA |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | FY1 Est. ${ }^{1}$ | FY2 Est. ${ }^{2}$ | FY1 Est. ${ }^{1}$ | FY2 Est. ${ }^{2}$ | FY1 Est. ${ }^{1}$ | FY2 Est. ${ }^{2}$ |
| Retail Peer Average | 6.3 | 6.2 | 6.5 | 6.3 | 33\% | 25\% |
| Retail Peer Median | 4.5 | 4.8 | 4.8 | 4.9 | 10\% | 4\% |
| Compensation Peer Group Average | 7.4 | 6.9 | 7.9 | 6.8 | 62\% | 31\% |
| KSS | 4.2 | 4.4 | 2.7 | 2.9 | (37\%) | (34\%) |

[^4]
## INSTITUTIONAL SUPPORT FOR KOHL'S IS WANING

The Board believes there is meaningful institutional support for management, but we do not see it analysts are more skeptical now than when we entered into a settlement agreement with Kohl's in April 2021

BANKOFAMERICA

BofA placed an "underperform" rating on the stock, down from "buy." The price target for the stock was reduced to $\$ 48$ from $\$ 75$.

Sept. 30, 2021

## J.P.Morgan

JPMorgan lowered Kohl's' price target to \$55 from \$73 and maintained a "neutral" rating.
"We lower our Dec '22 [...] given Off Price
\& Discount retailers' market share acceleration within apparel \& footwear, which has created an increasingly more competitive backdrop for KSS."

Jan. 4, 2022

UBS downgraded to "sell" from "neutral" and slashed its price target to Street-low \$38 on "challenging" outlook for the stock in 2022 on inflationary pressures."
"They now see Kohl's growth outlook among weakest in softlines sector, with new FY22 EPS estimate 41\% below consensus."

Jan. 7, 2022

## IN JUNE 2020, 6\% OF ANALYSTS HAD A 'SELL' RATING ON THE COMPANY. TODAY, 18\% OF ANALYSTS ARE SUGGESTING INVESTORS SHOULD 'SELL' THE STOCK.

KOHL'S' POOR PERFORMANCE IS EVIDENT IN THE FINANCIAL METRICS.

THE FOLLOWING SECTION ILLUMINATES THE PROBLEMS FROM THE CUSTOMER'S LIKELY
PERSPECTIVE THAT LED TO DECLINING SALES, MARKET SHARE LOSS AND MARGIN COMPRESSION.

IN CONJUNCTION WITH THIS SECTION, PLEASE VIEW OUR VIDEO.

## LOW EMPLOYEE ENGAGEMENT LIKELY LEADS TO A CULTURE OF DISENFRANCHISEMENT

Kohl's ranks in the bottom $40 \%$ of companies in terms of its employee net promoter score, which we believe is due to a lack of strong leadership


> Little Clarity
> "We never seem to really know who our customer is. "

## POOR CUSTOMER EXPERIENCE LEADS TO MISSED SALES

Recent customer feedback highlights customers' frustration with limited product assortment, confusing promotional discounts, poor service and an inaccessible website

- Kohl's scores in a range of 1-2, with 5 being the best, on many independent feedback forums

- Kohl's lags best-in-class retailers and ranks near the bottom when measuring customer feedback sentiment.
' 22 YTD Net Promotor Scores

Source: Customer Guru independent NPS scoring.

| $\begin{array}{l\|l} \text { RII } \quad \text { Rick } \\ \diamond 2 \text { reviews } & \text { Us } \end{array}$ |  | v" Victor "Victor" Homiedontplay <br> v" O 1 review ○ US | BM $\underset{\substack{\text { Barbara Murphy } \\ 0 \\ 2 \text { roviews }}}{\ominus}$ Us |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  |  |  |
| Kohls is guilty of fraud in my opinion | Will never shop or order from them again! | Terrible, Terrible, Terrible... | Worst online ordering experience EVER |

## POOR STORE STANDARDS \& PRESENTATION

Kohl's' stores struggle with details such as maintenance, size organization and product placement in many departments


SLOW INVENTORY TURN AND POOR PLANNING AND ALLOCATION HAVE LED TO OVERBUYING, WHICH CAUSES A POOR IN-STORE EXPERIENCE, EXCESSIVE CLEARANCE AND GROSS MARGIN PRESSURE

## PROMOTIONS LIKELY FRUSTRATE AND CONFUSE SHOPPERS



> "We're simplifying our pricing and promotional strategies and this is really resonating with our customers. We showed more simplified offers to new customers to reduce complexity." - Jill Timm on March 7, 2022


## PROMOTIONS LIKELY FRUSTRATE AND CONFUSE SHOPPERS (CONT.)

Customers seem to struggle to understand what they are actually paying for and whether they are getting a real deal
x Store-wide coupons, discounts and "Kohl's Cash" deals are confusing and often overlap
$x$ Often the customer receives an additional discount at the register, after they've decided to purchase
x Also, a "Kohl's Cash" discount can be applied if a customer has a credit from a previous transaction
$x$ There are often a long list of exclusions for many of the national brands

| Brands Excluded |
| :--- |
| Include: Calvin |
| Klein, Columbia, |
| Eddie Bauer, |
| Tommy Hilfiger, |
| Levi's, Draper James |

20\% COUPON IS VALID ON PURCHASES O3/21-03/22, 2022 ONLINE ONLY WITH ANY TENDER
TYPE. Enter code at Kohls. com to receive discount. Limit one coupon per customer. DOLLAR-OFF TYPE. Enter code at Konls.com to receive disCount. L imit one coupon per customer. DOLLAR-OFP
COUPONS, INCLUDING KOHL'S CASH' COUPONS, KOHL'S REWARDS' AND PROMOTIONAL GIFTS, WILL BE APPLIED PRIOR TO PERCENT-OFF TOTAL PURCHASE COUPONS. Coupon cannot be used in conjunction with other percent-of coupons, including age-speciric ciscounts. Coupon also no valid on price adiustments on prior purchasess payment on a Kobl's Card account, taxes, shipping and/or handling fees. Reproductions or duplicates sot acceppted. Coupon is nontransferable. See asift Cards; Kohl's Careses cause merchandise or other charitable items; select online-exclusives, premium athetic; beauty and fragrance (including Sephora at Kohl's purchasess); consumables; selecte electrics; premium electronics; emerging brands; premium footwear, mattresses; select personal care; sslect
novelty gifts; sporting goods; sports team merchandise; permium sunglasses; toys; Calvin Klein; novelty gifts; sporting goods; sports team merchandise; premium sunglasses; toys; Calvin Klein;
Columbia; Crocs; DRAPER JAMES RSVP; Eddie Bauer, The Honest Company; select KitchenAid; Columbla; Crocs; DRAPER JAMES RSVP; Eddie Bauer; The Honest Company; Select KitchenAid;
Koolabura by UGG; Lands' End; Lee; Levis'; Lovepop; Scentwor; S' 'wel; Tommy Hilifiger, TOMS; and
Wrangle. LOOK FOR SIGNS Wrangler LOOK FOR SIGNS IN STORE OR FIND A COMPLETE LST OF EXCLUSIONS AT
KOHLS.COM/EXCLUSIONS.

Store-Wide Discounts


In-Store Item Discounts + Store-Wide Discounts

"Kohl's Cash" Discounts + Item + Store-Wide Discounts


LOOK FOR SIGNS IN STORE OR FIND A COMPLETE LIST OF EXCLUSIONS AT KOHLS.COM

## INEFFECTIVE MARKETING \& ADVERTISING

With more than $\$ 850$ million in advertising expenses, we believe Kohl's should be producing better search results for its core products, which it has in abundance


DESPITE SEPHORA BEING ONE OF KOHL'S' MOST IMPORTANT INITIATIVES, THE COMPANY FAILS TO SUPPORT IT WITH MARKETING - JCPENNEY IS LISTED BEFORE KOHL'S!


## htps://www.pinterest.com , sephora

Sephora (sephora) | Official Pinterest account
Save space on your device. Sign up. User Avatar. Sephora. sephora.com.@sephora. Let's
Beauty Together. 963.6 k followers. . . 8 following. Follow.

```
https://www.jcpenney.com > sephora !
Discover top beauty brands at SEPHORA Inside JCPenney & online at JCPenney.com. Free
shipping available!
```

ttps://wnw.lvmh.com , houses , sephora
Sephora, cosmetics, fragrances - Selective Retailing - LVMH
Identity. Sephora's stores offer passionate beauty fans across the world a privileged freedom to touch and test products since 1969. The House provides a

## Sepat

Sephora: Buy Makeup \& Skincare 4+ - App Store
It is the best community of beauty product lovers simply because of the volume of prestige and
new brands. If you are a makeup minimalist or only like skincare
Location: This app may use your location eve... $\qquad$

## https://sephoraaccelerate.com

Sephora Accelerate
Brand Incubation Focused on Founders of Color ... For the past five years, Sephora Accelerate has been dedicated to building a community of innovative,

## https://www.timessquarenyc.org , locations ; sephora

Sephora | Times Square NYC
Sephora. 1535 Broadway New York, NY 10036. (212) 944-6789. Get Directions. Retail chain with
a selection of upmarket makeup, perfumes, beauty \& skincare
https://play.google.com > store , apps > details , id=co...
Sephora: Buy Makeup \& Skincare - Apps on Google Play
Makeup, skincare and beauty products lead to rewards and Beauty Insider Cash when you shop with Sephora! Discover the best cosmetics, makeup and skincare.
$\star \star \star \star \star$ Rating: $4.8 \cdot 74,892$ votes $\cdot$ Free $\cdot$ Android

```
Sephora Beauty Products \(\mid\) The Shops
Sephora Beauty Products | The Shops at Columbus Circle makeup, and tragance procucucts to topep you look and teel your
```




Related searches


UIIA Beauty websites
me Makeup websites with free shipping
N. What are the most popular makeup products


Goooo00000ogle

## DESPITE ATTEMPTING TO COURT YOUNGER AUDIENCES, KOHL'S TRAILS PEERS IN SOCIAL MEDIA ENGAGEMENT

Kohl's emphasized its marketing efforts to reach younger customers, but currently has half the Instagram followers of Nordstrom and 30\% fewer followers than Macy's


## CONFUSING ONLINE SHOPPING EXPERIENCE FRUSTRATES CUSTOMERS

## Site navigation to find and locate product is difficult, discounts are confusing and shipping is slow and inaccurate, all of which leads to an unhappy customer

## Poor Site Navigation \& Shipping Struggles

- Items claim to be on sale, but are not discounted upon check out
- Pick up in store is free - if you are willing to drive 40 miles
- Four-day delivery is $\$ 30$ as compared to two-day free


Source: Koh's.com \& Google Reviews Week of April 4t, 2022.

## Customer Frustration

- Hard to navigate, slow and unpredictable delivery experience translates to frustrated customers.


## 

Jan 18, 2022
This is the worst website I have ever...
This is the worst website I have ever tried to navigate. I get locked out constantly and end up waiting on hold for someone to fix my issues. It is nearly impossible to get a person on the phone. I will be closing my account after nearly 20 years.

Jan 14, 2022
Worst online ordering experience EVER

## 

Updated Feb 14, 2022

## Hire a web designer

Itt is a clustered disaster mess! The catalogs are extremely difficult to navigate


```
Feb 24, 2022
```

I ordered shoes it showed to take a...
I ordered shoes it showed to take a week so I was waiting patiently and then half way through the week they cancels on me very dissatisfied disappointed and very unprofessional

## SPLIT SHIPMENTS CONTINUE TO DRAG GROSS MARGINS LOWER

Many years after identifying the split shipment problem, Kohl's has still not fixed it

- For example, an order of eight SKUs led to two shipments, including very similar Men's Socks, is packed and shipped from two different locations across the country and by two separate shipping companies




## PROBLEMS IN PLANNING AND ALLOCATION OFTEN LEAD TO SIGNIFICANT MARKDOWNS AND GROSS MARGIN PRESSURE

These pictures, recently taken, do not suggest Kohl's lacked inventory needed to drive sales in Q4
Put simply, Kohl's has plenty of inventory
However, it appear to lack the inventory the typical customer wants...
"We experienced significant additional inventory receipt delays and were unable to fulfill all of the customer demand during this critical holiday time. [...] This gives us confidence that as we improve our inventory position in 2022, we will be able to better capture customer demand and drive sales growth."

- Michelle Gass, CEO 3/01/2022, Q4 Analyst Call



## PROBLEMS IN PLANNING AND ALLOCATION CAN LEAD TO MISSED SALES OPPORTUNITIES

Lack of rigorous and analytical planning leads to out-of-stock issues in everyday basic items


Out of Stock in sizes $10,12,14 \& 16$ represents $\sim 80 \%$ of the sales potential for this Women's jean

Industry best practices are detailed key item planning by store location with backup inventory in the distribution center to
replenish

Out of Stock in sizes Medium and Large represents -70\% of the sales potential for this Women's tank top

## \$8 BILLION IN REAL ESTATE SITS IDLE ON BALANCE SHEET

The Board could have a significant opportunity to monetize the Company's real estate assets and make meaningfully accretive repurchases

Not only does Kohl's trade at the lowest valuation among its peers on EBITDA, shareholders receive no value for the owned real estate

|  | Square <br> Footage | Price Per <br> Square Foot | Purchase <br> Price | Purchase <br> Price |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  <br> Office | $1,183,747$ | $\$ 280-\$ 325$ | $\$ 331,449,160$ | $\$ 384,717,775$ |
| Distribution Centers | $4,205,000$ | $\$ 80-\$ 100$ | $\$ 336,400,000$ | $\$ 420,500,000$ |
| Fulfillment Centers | $7,435,000$ | $\$ 80-\$ 125$ | $\$ 594,800,000$ | $\$ 929,375,000$ |
| Retail Portfolio | $29,039,000$ | $\$ 160-\$ 220$ | $\$ 4,646,240,000$ | $\$ 6,388,580,000$ |
| TOTAL | $\mathbf{4 1 , 8 6 2 , 7 4 7}$ | $\mathbf{\$ 1 4 1 - \$ 1 9 4}$ | $\$ 5,908,889,160$ | $\$ 8,123,172,775$ |

## WITHOUT A MEANINGFUL INCREASE IN THE SALES LIFT, SEPHORA COULD PROVE TO HAVE A NEGATIVE EBIT IMPACT

## While Sephora is likely to drive traffic and is demonstrating a mid-single-digit lift to sales, we are concerned about its ultimate accretion to the bottom line

- By our calculations, Kohl's is spending just shy of $\$ 1$ million to remodel a store with a Sephora shop ( $\$ 200$ million of incremental capital expenditures over the 11-year, average capital expenditures baseline of $\$ 650$ million for 200 additional Sephora stores)
- Assuming a mid-single-digit lift to sales, a $50 \%$ merchandise margin (above the corporate average) and $50 \%$ profit split with Sephora, as the Company disclosed, the gross margin benefit for an average $\$ 16$ million Kohl's stores is $\$ 200,000$. Given the added payroll from Kohl's staffing the shop with "highly trained Sephora associates," Kohl's is likely just breaking even on an EBITDA basis
- Depreciating the almost \$1 million capital expenditure per store over 10 years ( $\$ 100 \mathrm{~K}$ a year), would imply the Sephora shop's contribution to EBIT could actually prove to have an overall net negative effect.
- Kohl's claims that Sephora will generate $\$ 2$ billion in sales or $\$ 2.4$ million per 850 shops. That implies the sales lift required to make the capital expenditures for a Sephora remodel accretive has to grow from the mid-single-digits to mid-teens level over the next few years.
- In our experience, remodels and new shop-in-shops historically peak early in their life cycle and fade with time - not increase three-fold

| Number of Sephora Stores | 850 | 850 |
| :--- | ---: | ---: |
| Cost to remodel a store | $\$ 750,000$ | $\$ 1,000,000$ |
|  |  |  |
| Incrimental CapEx Associated with Sephora Stores | $\$ 637,500,000$ | $\$ 850,000,000$ |
|  |  |  |
|  |  |  |
| Sephora Sales Lift (850 Stores) | $\$ 680,000,000$ | $\$ 680,000,000$ |
| Merchandise Margin (50\%) | $\$ 340,000,000$ | $\$ 340,000,000$ |
| Profit Split with Sephora (50\%) | $\$ 170,000,000$ | $\$ 170,000,000$ |
| Incremental Payroll | $\$ 148,512,000$ | $\$ 148,512,000$ |
| Sub-Total Kohl's Profit Split | $\$ 21,488,000$ | $\$ 21,488,000$ |
| Additional Depreciating Capex (\$75-100k per store) | $\$ 63,750,000$ | $\$ 85,000,000$ |
| EBIT Impact with Sephora at Scale | $\mathbf{\$ 4 2 , 2 6 2 , 0 0 0 )}$ | $\mathbf{( \$ 6 3 , 5 1 2 , 0 0 0 )}$ |
| Source: SEC Filings; KSS 10 -KReports, Macellum Estimates on Additional Depreciation and Costo of remodel per store. |  |  |

## SIGNIFICANT BOARDROOM GAPS

Lack of retail sector expertise from the incumbent Board, with the exception of Macellum's 2021 nominees, has contributed to poor oversight

区 Denotes inadequacy

* Denotes executive committee

|  | Bender | Boneparth* | Cossett | Day | Floyd | Gass* | Mitchell | Prising* | Schlifske* | Shapira | Streeter ${ }^{*}$ |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Prior Public Board Experience |  |  | X |  |  |  | X |  | $x$ |  |  |
| Apparel Sector Expertise |  |  | X |  | X |  |  | X | X | X | X |
| Retail Sector Expertise |  |  |  |  | X |  |  | X | X |  | X |
| Marketing/Strategy Experience | X | $\times$ | X |  | X |  |  | X | $\times$ | X |  |
| Merchandising Experience |  |  | X | X | X |  |  | X | X | X | X |
| Real Estate Expertise | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X |
| Corporate Governance Acumen | $\times$ | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | $X$ | X | X |
| M\&A Expertise | X |  | X | X | X | X |  | X | X | X | X |
| Capital Markets Acumen | X |  | X | X | X | X | X |  |  |  | X |

## EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE IS COMPRISED OF LONGTENURED INCUMBENTS WITHOUT RETAIL EXPERTISE

From the guidelines: "...Executive Committee which shall have and may exercise all of the powers and authority of the Board in the management of the Company's business and affairs between regularly scheduled meetings of the Board of Directors"


PETER
BONEPARTH
x 14-Year Tenure
x Lack of Marketing/Strategy Experience
x Lack of Real Estate Expertise
x Lack of Corporate Governance Acumen
x Lack of Diversity


JONAS PRISING
x 7-Year Tenure
x Lack of Apparel \& Retail Sector Expertise
x Lack of Marketing/Strategy Experience
x Lack of Merchandising Experience
x Lack of Real Estate \& M\&A Expertise
x Lack of Corporate Governance Acumen
$\times \quad$ Lack of Diversity


JOHN E. SCHLIFSKE
x 11-Year Tenure
x Lack of Prior Public Board Experience
x Lack of Apparel \& Retail Sector Expertise
Lack of Marketing /Strategy \& Merchandising Experience
x Lack of Real Estate \& M\&A Expertise Lack of Corporate Governance Acumen Lack of Diversity


## STEPHANIE A.

 STREETERx 15-Year Tenure
x Lack of Apparel Sector Expertise x Lack of Retail Sector Expertise

## x Lack of Merchandising Experience

$x$ Lack of Real Estate Expertise
x Lack of Corporate Governance Acumen
x Lack of M\&A Expertise \& Capital Markets Acumen

## POORLY

## The Board appears more focused on undermining a credible sale process rather than evaluating potential pathways to shareholder value creation

x The Company hastily rejected indications of interest from two credible and well-capitalized acquirers before providing sufficient access to management, a data room and other information that could inform upward adjustments to bids. The Board's rejections came just two weeks after outreach from potential acquirers, reaffirming our belief that a majority of the Board is entrenched and lacks the objectivity necessary to evaluate potentially value-maximizing sale opportunities
x The Board rushed to implement an onerous two-tiered poison pill that could likely only serve to chill acquirer's interest. While the Board may point to the 'qualified offer' exception, the various requirements that must be met to be a 'qualified offer' all but ensure that no unsolicited offer will ever be made
$\times$ The Company failed to communicate clearly and effectively about its purported process for evaluating potential acquirers' proposals and overtures, even as rumors swirled about a growing set of suitors
$x$ Why would the stock trade at a material discount to reported and disclosed offers if investors thought the Board was serious about pursuing the best risk-adjusted outcome for shareholders?

GIVEN RECENT DEVELOPMENTS, WE QUESTION WHETHER THIS BOARD CAN BE TRUSTED TO RUN A FAIR AND CREDIBLE REVIEW OF STRATEGIC ALTERNATIVES

## THE BOARD APPROVED AN ONEROUS POISON PILL THAT SEEMS LIKELY TO CHILL A PROCESS

## Shareholders will never know what might have occurred in the absence of this pill

- Following reported expressions of interest in acquiring the Company, the Board adopted what appears to be an onerous, two-tiered poison pill - indicating to us it is also no longer prioritizing maximizing shareholder value and leading us to question the robustness of its strategic review process
- The pill prevents a potential acquirer from bringing an offer directly to shareholders without risking substantial dilution - in fact, simply announcing an intent to commence a tender offer (as opposed to consummating one) triggers the pill
- While the Board may claim it has built in a "qualified offer" exception, the numerous requirements to be deemed a "qualified offer" all but ensure that no unsolicited offer will ever be made.
- The requirements include that an offer must be fully-financed with committed capital, not subject to any due diligence and not arbitrarily deemed "inadequate" by the Company's retained investment bank
- To add insult to injury, the Board also did not commit to submitting the pill for shareholder approval, despite having an opportunity to do so at the upcoming Annual Meeting

> IN OUR VIEW, ANY DIRECTORS THAT SUPPORT SUCH A PATENTLY ANTI-SHAREHOLDER MANEUVER CANNOT BE TRUSTED TO CREDIBLY EVALUATE POTENTIALLY VALUE-MAXIMIZING ALTERNATIVES VERSUS MANAGEMENT'S PERPETUALLY INEFFECTIVE PLANS

## INABILITY TO ALIGN MANAGEMENT WITH

## The Board's compensation plan continually rewards executives despite years of underperformance by consistently including short- and long-term targets for bonuses that are below prior years' results

x Annual Incentive Plan - The Board has a long track record of lowering the performance bar while operational results have deteriorated, and the stock price has suffered
x In every year since 2010, the Board set the threshold tier net income target of the Annual Incentive Plan at or below the prior year's actual net income
x Long-Term Incentive Plan ("LTIP") - We believe that the Board has failed to use the LTIP program, the largest single component of compensation, as an effective tool - driving expenses higher while results worsened
x Total compensation for Kohl's top five executives equaled more than $\$ 327$ million for the period 2011 to 2021 while sales stagnated, and operating income declined by approximately $22 \%$
x The Board sets low performance targets that are inconsistent with its own stated compensation philosophy and the guidance the Company provides the market
x In contrast to its claim that "failure to achieve target goals has significant consequences," the Board paid maximum bonuses to management in 2017 despite performance that was well below results just 2 years earlier and paid a maximum bonus in 2018 for only 3\% EBIT growth over 2017

## INABILITY <br> TO ALIGN SHAREHOLDERS (CONT.)

## LTIP goals were consistently set lower and rewarded declining results

- The Board set net income lower targets in 2017 and 2018 by (23)\% and (9)\%, respectively, versus the prior year's actual results
- Net income targets fell by $16 \%$ from 2015 to 2018
- Ms. Gass was paid a 200\% LTIP in 2019 for achieving results $10 \%$ lower than the target set just two years earlier

| Kohl's Long-Term Incentive Plans (\$mm) | 2014-2016 | 2015-2017 | 2016-2018 | 2017-2019 | $\mathbf{2 0 1 8 - 2 0 2 0}$ |
| :---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| Average 3-Yr Sales Target | $\$ 19,867$ | $\$ 20,230$ | $\$ 19,593$ | $\$ 18,327$ | $\$ 18,863$ |
| \% chg. vs. immediately preceding year | $4 \%$ | $7 \%$ | $2 \%$ | $(2 \%)$ | $(1 \%)$ |
| Average 3-Yr Adjusted Net Income Target | $\$ 913$ | $\$ 923$ | $\$ 773$ | $\$ 520$ | $\$ 777$ |
| \% chg. vs. immediately preceding year | $3 \%$ | $6 \%$ | $(1 \%)$ | $(23 \%)$ | $(9 \%)$ |
| Average 3-Yr Sales, Actual | $\$ 18,971$ | $\$ 18,993$ | $\$ 18,946$ | $\$ 19,029$ | $\$ 17,694$ |
| \% chg. vs. immediately preceding year | $(0 \%)$ | $0 \%$ | $(1 \%)$ | $2 \%$ | $(7 \%)$ |
| Actual 3-Yr Average Adjusted Net Income | $\$ 774$ | $\$ 740$ | $\$ 789$ | $\$ 821$ | $\$ 419$ |
| \% chg. vs. immediately preceding year | $(13 \%)$ | $(15 \%)$ | $1 \%$ | $22 \%$ | $(51 \%)$ |
| CEO LTIP Payout as \% of Target Level | $62.4 \%$ | $25.1 \%$ | $118.3 \%$ | $200.0 \%$ | $83.5 \%$ |

## INABILITY <br> TO ALIGN SHAREHOLDERS (CONT.)

Kohl's' annual incentive plan awarded Ms. Gass a maximum 250\% bonus in 2017 despite operating income that was (9)\% below 2015. The following year, she received a $250 \%$ bonus for growing operating income $3.4 \%$. Additionally in 2020, she received a $175 \%$ bonus for negative operating income, and a 263\% bonus in 2021 for earnings 11\% below "Greatness Agenda" targets

CEO Award vs. "Greatness Agenda" Adj. Operating Income Target \& Actual (\$mm)



## INABILITY TO ALIGN SHAREHOLDERS (CONT.)

CEO total compensation has increased $37 \%$ to $\$ 12.9$ million from $\$ 9.4$ million in 2011 , while EBIT over the same period has declined $22 \%$ from $\$ 2,158$ million to $\$ 1,680$ million in 2021

The CEO has been paid a total of $\$ 110$ million since 2011, all while EBIT has declined $22 \%$ over the same period


## INABILITY TO ALIGN SHAREHOLDERS (CONT.)

## The Board revised the 2018-2020 LTIP plan that resulted in a payout for executives

x In January 2021, long after the economy showed signs of recovering from the COVID pandemic and when it was known to the Board that the large performance share unit award granted to the CEO in March 2020 had appreciated dramatically (to a potential value of more than $\$ 25$ million), the Board revised the LTIP plan to increase the CEO's pay
x As a result of the Board's ex post facto adjustments, Kohl's CEO received an 83.5\% LTIP payout for the 2018-2020 period, valued at more than $\$ 2.5$ million, despite missing the original target by $35 \%$. Does this really ensure "fairness to Kohl's shareholders," who experienced a $21 \%$ decline in stock price in 2020, or more importantly to the thousands of employees who lost their jobs or were furloughed during the pandemic?
x The CEO to median employee pay ratio was 1,098:1 in 2020, increasing from 923:1 in 2019

| Metric | $2018-2020$ | 2018 | 2019 | 2020 | $2018-2020$ | Actual vs. Goal |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | Goal | Actual | Actual | Actual | Actual |  |
| Net Sales | $\$ 56,590$ | $\$ 19,167$ | $\$ 18,885$ | $\$ 15,031$ | $\mathbf{\$ 5 3 , 0 8 3}$ | $(6 \%)$ |
| Adjusted Net Income | $\$ 2,330$ | $\$ 927$ | $\$ 769$ | $(\$ 186)$ | $\mathbf{\$ 1 , 5 1 0}$ | $(35 \%)$ |

## DESPITE ALL OF KOHL'S' ESG CLAIMS, IT INCURRED THE LARGEST PENALTY FOR GREENWASHING

"The Commission has asked the court to order Kohl's and Walmart to stop making deceptive green claims or using other misleading advertising, and pay penalties of $\$ 2.5$ million and
\$3 million, respectively, by far the largest penalties in this area. The complaints and proposed orders were filed by the U.S. Department of Justice on the FTC's behalf. "Kohl's and Walmart
are paying millions of dollars under the FTC's
Penalty Offense Authority for mislabeling their rayon products as bamboo," said Samuel Levine,

Director of the FTC's Bureau of Consumer Protection. "False environmental claims harm both consumers and honest businesses, and companies that greenwash can expect to pay a price."


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## For reatese

FTC Uses Penalty Offense Authority to Seek Largest-Ever Civil Penalty for Bogus Bamboo Marketing from Kohl's and Walmart Companies Will Pay a Total of $\$ 5.5$ Million and Will Halt Deceptive Environmental Claims

The Commission has asked the court to order Koh's's and Walmart to stop making deceptive green. claims or using other misleading advertising, and pay penalties of $\$ 2.5$ million and $\$ 3$ million, respectively, by far the largest penalties in this area. The complaints and proposed orders were filed by the U.S. Department of Justice on the FTC's behalf.
"Koh's and Walmart are paying millions of dollars under the FTC's Penalty Offense Authority for mislabeling their rayon products as bamboo," said Samuel Levine, Director of the FTC's Bureau of Consumer Protection. "False environmental claims harm both consumers and honest businesses, and companies that greenwash can expect to pay a price."


## SONOMA

GOODS FOR


Discover sustainable solutions for a healthy future.


> DESPITE FINES FROM THE FTC AND A COURT ORDER TO STOP MAKING DECEPTIVE ECO-FRIENDLY CLAIMS, KOHL'S STILL HAS POTENTIALLY DECEPTIVE SUSTAINABILITY ADVERTISING IN STORES

## OUR SLATE

## HOW OUR NOMINEES STACK UP

## Macellum has nominated a slate of 10 highly qualified and experienced director candidates

|  | Brokaw | Duskin | Duane | Edwards | Hawkins | Kantor | Mandarino | Murray | Seipel | Young |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Public Board Experience | $\checkmark$ | $\checkmark$ | $\checkmark$ |  |  |  | $\checkmark$ |  | $\checkmark$ |  |
| Apparel Sector Expertise |  | $\checkmark$ | $\square$ | $\checkmark$ |  | $\square$ |  | $\square$ | $\square$ |  |
| Retail Sector Expertise |  | $\checkmark$ | $\square$ | $\checkmark$ |  | $\square$ |  | $\checkmark$ | $\square$ |  |
| Marketing/Strategy Experience |  |  | $\checkmark$ | $\checkmark$ |  | $\checkmark$ |  | $\checkmark$ | $\checkmark$ |  |
| Merchandising Experience |  |  | $\checkmark$ |  |  | $\checkmark$ |  | $\checkmark$ | $\checkmark$ |  |
| Real Estate Expertise | $\checkmark$ | $\checkmark$ | $\square$ | $\checkmark$ |  | $\checkmark$ | $\checkmark$ |  | $\square$ | $\checkmark$ |
| Corporate Governance Acumen | $\checkmark$ | $\checkmark$ | $\checkmark$ | $\checkmark$ | $\checkmark$ | $\checkmark$ | $\checkmark$ |  | $\checkmark$ |  |
| M\&A Expertise | $\checkmark$ | $\square$ | $\checkmark$ |  |  |  | $\checkmark$ |  | $\checkmark$ | $\checkmark$ |
| Capital Markets Acumen | $\checkmark$ | $\checkmark$ |  | $\checkmark$ |  |  | $\checkmark$ |  |  | $\checkmark$ |
| Board Diversity (Gender or Racial/Ethnic) |  |  |  | $\checkmark$ | $\checkmark$ |  |  | $\checkmark$ |  |  |

## GEORGE BROKAW

We believe Mr. Brokaw's background as an investment banker, M\&A expert and public company director can help the Board run a credible sale process and explore all paths to enhanced value creation


- Currently a director at DISH Network Corporation (NASDAQ: DISH), CTO Realty Growth, Inc. (NYSE: CTO) and Alico, Inc. (NASDAQ: ALCO).
- Former Managing Director (Mergers \& Acquisitions) at Lazard Frères \& Co. LLC, where he advised a variety of companies on successful transactions.
- Former Managing Director of the Highbridge Growth Equity Fund at Highbridge Principal Strategies, LLC and former Managing Director and Head of Private Equity at Perry Capital, LLC.
- Received a B.A. from Yale University and a J.D. and M.B.A from the University of Virginia and is a member of the New York Bar.


## 66

"George's background as a banker, lawyer and investor enables him to see complex corporate situations from various perspectives, resulting in better outcomes for all parties involved. He has the unique ability to go deep on capital allocation, corporate finance and other market issues while also helping companies remain focused on their big picture strategies. I feel George is uniquely qualified to serve on any board that is comparing a revised standalone plan to strategic alternatives." 99

## 66 <br> George has been invaluable in helping craft a longterm strategy for our business and has provided critical insight surrounding financial planning. Moreover, he has helped lead the Board in a constructive manner to ensure maximum shareholder value. <br> John Kiernan, President and CEO of Alico, Inc. (NASDAQ:ALCO)

Michael Gorzynski, Executive Chairman at Continental General

[^5]
## JONATHAN DUSKIN

We believe Mr. Duskin's capital markets acumen, significant retail sector investing experience and independent shareholder perspectives can help the Board pursue and evaluate all paths to maximizing value for shareholders


- Chief Executive Officer of Macellum Capital Management, an investment management firm, with more than 20 years of experience investing in retail and consumer sectors.
- Former Managing Director at Prentice Capital Management, LP and Managing Director at S.A.C. Capital Associates LLC.
- Former Chairman of the Investment Committee in the Research Department at Lehman Brothers Inc.
- Currently serves on the Board of Directors of Citi Trends, Inc. (NASDAQ: CTRN), a growing specialty value retailer of apparel, accessories and home trends.
- Holds a B.A. from The University of Massachusetts Amherst.


#### Abstract

Jon and I have worked closely over many years and he is a 6 positive and constructive force for collegiality and progress in the boardroom. He appropriately challenges management by demanding financial rigor, operational excellence and the implementation of best practices. He also has a unique ability to help executives balance short-term needs with long-term opportunities that can create value for customers and shareholders alike.

Seth Johnson, Board of Directors and Chairperson of Audit Committee at Tilly's;


 Former Chief Operating Officer and Vice Chairman of Abercrombie and Fitch.> 66
> Jon is a positive and constructive force for collegiality and progress in the boardroom. He appropriately challenges management by demanding financial rigor and operational excellence. He also has a unique ability to help executives balance short-term needs with long-term opportunities that can create value for customers and shareholders
> alike.

66 I've known Jon and worked closely with him for over a decade. Jon has an exceptional understandings of the retail industry and how to turn companies around. In addition to understanding capital allocation and finance, he has unique comprehension of merchandising, marketing, supply chain and other critical operational areas. He has proven to be a real asset, especially in opportunistic situations as a partner in strategy.

## FRANCIS KEN DUANE

We believe Mr. Duane's more than three decades of experience as a C-suite executive at leading public retailers can help management establish a new strategic plan that pursues greater operational efficiency, more aligned executive compensation and an optimized balance sheet


- Former Executive Vice Chairman at PVH Corp. (NYSE: PVH), one of the world's largest fashion companies owning brands such as Tommy Hilfiger and Warner's, where he helped grow revenues from $\$ 1$ billion to $\$ 10$ billion and led the development and launch of Calvin Klein, which currently represents nearly 50\% of PVH Corp.'s total revenue.
- Former Chief Executive Officer of Heritage Brands and former President of IZOD.
- Former President, Worldwide of Guess?, Inc. (NYSE: GES) and former senior executive at Nautica Enterprises, Inc. (formerly NASDAQ: NAUT), Hugo Boss AG and Burberry Group plc.
- Previously served on the Board of Governors of GS1 US, an information standards organization focused on solving supply chain problems across industries, and on the Board of Directors of Ariat International, Inc., a leading manufacturer of innovative performance equestrian footwear, apparel and belts.
- Holds a B.S. and Honorary Doctorate from Merrimack College.

$$
\begin{array}{|l}
66 \\
\text { Ken develops long-term working relationships built } \\
\text { on trust and mutual respect. He applies his strong } \\
\text { business acumen to all situations. This skill, along } \\
\text { with Ken's clear understanding of merchandising, } \\
\text { has aided him in building many businesses. }
\end{array}
$$

Barbara Rentler, Vice Chair \& Chief Executive Officer, Ross Stores, Inc. (NASDAQ: ROST)

## 66

Ken not only managed a vast team of executives at PVH for their wholesale distribution, but he facilitated to integrate the woman's licensing business from under \$100 million to over \$1 billion. Ken's professional strengths are complemented by his demonstrated leadership skills and well-rounded knowledge of fashion apparel which makes him an invaluable asset and
exceptional candidate for a consumer retail business.

## 66

Ken's ability to understand the apparel sector and get things done is second to none. He is a great leader who brings together and motivates people while treating them with dignity and respect.

[^6]
## PAMELA J. EDWARDS

We believe Ms. Edwards' business and financial planning expertise and extensive executive-level experience in finance, strategy and operations across a variety of retail brands and sectors can help improve the Company's balance sheet and objectively assess standalone strategic growth plans


- Chief Financial Officer and Executive Vice President of Citi Trends, Inc. (NASDAQ: CTRN) (retiring from CTRN in April 2022).
- Former executive at L Brands Inc. (n/k/a Bath \& Body Works, Inc. (NYSE: BBWI)), where she held C-level roles at Mast Global, Victoria's Secret (n/k/a Victoria's Secret \& Co. (NYSE: VSCO)) - where she established a business strategy that contributed to the $\sim \$ 7$ billion brand achieving 50\% profit growth - and Express (n/k/a Express, Inc. (NYSE: EXPR)).
- Currently serves on the Board of Directors of Neiman Marcus Group, LLC, where she serves as Chair of the Audit Committee.
- Was named one of Savoy Magazine’s 2021 Most Influential Black Corporate Directors.
- Holds a B.S. from Florida A\&M University and an M.B.A from the Fuqua School of Business at Duke University.

$$
\begin{aligned}
& 66 \text { Pam has a unique combination of CFO \& COO } \\
& \text { operating experience. Not only does she understand } \\
& \text { the numbers she also understands the retail business } \\
& \text { end-to-end. When it comes to strategic planning, } \\
& \text { establishing goals for organic growth or establishing } \\
& \text { Key Performance Indicators, she has the knowledge } \\
& \text { and experience necessary to achieve results. 9, }
\end{aligned}
$$

Heather Wilson, CEO of Clara Analytics, Inc.

## 66 <br> Pam has a great way of getting right to the heart of a topic and doing so in a style which helps align others around the crux of the issue and potential solutions moving forward.

99

Donna James, Chairwoman of the Board of Directors of Victoria's Secret \& Co.

## 66

Pam Edwards has deep retail, financial and operations expertise. She is a strategic leader who fosters a culture of performance and transparency. Pam's experience across multiple brands at various stages of growth or turnaround is an added dimension she will bring to any boardroom.

Paul Brown, Chairman of the Board of Directors of Neiman
Marcus Group Board of Directors; and CEO of Inspire Brands,

## STACY HAWKINS

We believe Ms. Hawkins' diversity consultancy experience, legal expertise and strong knowledge of public company governance can help the Board meaningfully improve its diversity initiatives as well as enhance its corporate governance and executive compensation policies


- Vice Dean of Rutgers Law School, the largest public law school in the Northeast, and has served as a Professor of Law at Rutgers since 2018, as well as an independent diversity and employment practices consultant since 2007.
- Previously held roles in diversity counseling at Ballard Spahr Andrews \& Ingersoll, LLP, Holland \& Knight LLP and Littler Mendelson, PC, a U.S.-based law firm that handles labor and employment litigation.
- Holds a Bachelor of Arts from the University of Virginia and a J.D. from the Georgetown University Law Center.

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6 6
Professor Hawkins brings clarity, precision and professionalism to every task she encounters and every challenge she overcomes, and, for so doing, is a highly sought- after constructive partner on ambitious initiatives.
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John Jay Hoffman, Esq., Senior Vice President \& General Counsel of Rutgers, The State University of New Jersey

## 66

We were able to access her deep knowledge of the history and contemporary business case for DEI and formulate a realistic path forward that was both aspirational and responsive to the needs and expectations of our customers and employees. Stacy's combination of intellect, cultural competence, and business savvy make her an outstanding choice for a public company director.

Jennifer Clarke, former Executive Director of Public Interest Law Center

## 66

I worked with Stacy as she consistently and effectively
ensured that the organization's low-income, minority clients not only received superior legal service, but had a voice at the table in guiding the firm's strategic direction and operation. She brought her serious purpose, preparation and hard work to her board service, a reflection of unsurpassed commitment to the organization and its clients.

## JEFFREY A. KANTOR

We believe Mr. Kantor's nearly 40 years of retail industry experience overseeing merchandising, planning, private label development and ecommerce can help turn around the Company's continued underperformance, pursue strategic and business improvements and earn back market share


- Former senior executive at Macy's, Inc. (NYSE: M), an American department store chain, including as Chief Merchandising Officer and Chief Stores Officer.
- Former Chairman of Macys.com, Macy's ecommerce division, and Chief Executive Officer and President of the Hecht's Company, a large chain of department stores.
- Currently serves as President of JAK Consulting, a consulting services firm focused on retail and wholesale business strategy, and on the Board of Directors of Ronald McDonald House New York, a children's charity that provides temporary accommodation for medical patients.
- Holds a B.B.A from The University of Massachusetts Amherst.


## ENDORSEMENTS FOR MR. KANTOR

$$
\begin{aligned}
& 66 \text { Jeff's business acumen and overall organizational } \\
& \text { perspective is ideal for the board of a public company. } \\
& \text { His experience leading E-Commerce, Merchandising, } \\
& \text { Stores, Real Estate, and Human Resources would be } \\
& \text { invaluable. [...] In my experience, no leader gets more } \\
& \text { out of his teams. }
\end{aligned}
$$

John Harper, former CEO of Splitit Payments Limited (ASX: SPT) (OTCMKTS: STTTF) and former COO of Macy's Inc. (NYSE: M)

66
His vision, open mindedness, creativity, flexibility and strategic thinking enabled him to successfully navigate through a career of mergers and acquisitions. [...] His authenticity and selfawareness along with his interpersonal communication skills enabled him to be an inspirational leader.

Jimmy Rosenfeld, former President of Fishman \& Tobin Inc.


## PERRY M. MANDARINO

We believe Mr. Mandarino's investment banking background and experience advising stakeholders on business and financial strategy across the retail and consumer industries can help the Board capitalize on the Company's strong brand, value creation potential and ample real estate assets


- Co-Head of Investment Banking, Head of Restructuring and Senior Managing Director of B. Riley Securities, Inc., a full-service investment bank and broker-dealer that provides corporate finance, sales, trading and equity research to institutional clients and that is a subsidiary of B. Riley Financial, Inc. (NASDAQ: RILY).
- Former Partner and U.S. Practice Leader of Business Recovery Services for PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP and Senior Managing Director of Traxi LLC, where he provided audit, tax, corporate restructuring and consulting services to large corporations.
- Has advised buyers and sellers of more than 30 retailers with an aggregate 5,500 store count as well as billions of dollars in revenue and value.
- Currently serves on the Board of Directors of bebe stores, inc. (OTCMKTS: BEBE), a global specialty retailer of women's apparel and accessories.
- Holds a B.S. from Seton Hall University.


## 66

Public boards require fresh visions and Perry is a creative, experienced leader with decades of experience crafting complex solutions that deliver results. Perry is also experienced at designing systems to hold such visions accountable. Perry has significant leadership, vision and discernment built on decades of experience crafting deals that deliver value.

## 66

Perry has tremendous domain knowledge and takes a lot of interest to provide the best financial solutions to companies seeking him out. He is a natural leader without being obvious and in your face kind of way.

Achintya Moulick MD, MBA, MCh, CEO of CarePoint Health Systems

Michael Wysocki, CEO of Wydrocarbon

## CYNTHIA S. MURRAY

We believe Ms. Murray's significant executive expertise in the retail and apparel sector, with more than 35 years of experience leading business turnarounds, share price growth and long-term strategy, can help the Board properly oversee the Company's business operations and strategy.


- Former President of Chico's Brand, FAS, Inc. (NYSE: CHS), one of the fastest retail turnarounds in women's specialty apparel, delivering record breaking results.
- Former President of Full Beauty Brands, a plus size women's and men's apparel and home goods holding company.
- Former senior executive at Talbots, Inc., a specialty retailer for women's apparel, where she executed a turnaround that grew the stock by $4 x$.
- Previously served on the Board of Directors of Francesca's Collections prior to its initial public offering in 2011.
- Currently serves as Founder and Chief Executive Officer of Stanmore Partners, a senior leadership consultancy for CEOs, private equity firms and start-ups.
- Holds a B.S. from the Florida State University, where she has served on the Board of Governors of the College of Business since 2014


## 66

Cinny has the rare ability to recognize significant consumer shifts well in advance of competitors, which is an invaluable strategic advantage as an advisor. She also has a history of acting on her instincts to build brands with an amazing track record.

Bonnie Brooks, Executive Chair of Chico's FAS, Inc. (NYSE: CHS) and former Vice Chair of Hudson's Bay Company

## 66

Cinny is a strategic thought leader. She is able to quickly assess brand and business opportunities. She moves expeditiously to inspire and unite the organization, challenging them to think differently in building strategy and delivering results.

$$
\begin{aligned}
& 66 \\
& \text { Cinny's creative vision, coupled with her pragmatic } \\
& \text { operational expertise, is a unique and highly- } \\
& \text { effective blend of capabilities. In a market where } \\
& \text { innovation and agility are imperatives of success, } \\
& \text { Cinny helps an organization excel in managing } \\
& \text { change and transformation. }
\end{aligned}
$$

Jeanette L. Gorgas, Director of Delivery Hero (OTCMKTS: DLVHF) and Sunlight Financial Holdings Inc (NYSE: SUNL)

Emilie Arel, President and CEO of Casper Sleep Inc. (NYSE: CSPR)

## KENNETH D. SEIPEL

We believe Mr. Seipel's strong track record of helping grow and turn around retail companies as well as Fortune 500 brands can help the Board streamline the Company's value proposition, create a compelling merchandise assortment and rationalize distribution.


- Former Chief Executive Officer of Gabriel Brothers, Inc. (n/k/a Gabe's), a value department store retailer, where he led a turnaround resulting in rapid sales and profit growth.
- Former President and Chief Operating Officer of Wet Seal, Inc. (n/k/a The Wet Seal, LLC), a fast fashion retailer and President and Chief Merchandise/Marketing Officer of Pamida Discount Stores LLC, a regional discount chain of department stores.
- Former Executive Vice President of Stores, Operations and Store Design of Old Navy.
- Currently serves as Principal of Retail Business Optimization LLC, a consulting firm focused on helping retailers optimize their business model execution, and on the Board of Directors of Citi Trends, Inc. (NASDAQ: CTRN), a growing specialty value retailer of apparel, accessories and home trends, and as Lead Independent Director of West Marine, Inc., where he oversaw massive value creation efforts.
- Holds a B.A. from the University of Wisconsin-Green Bay.


## ENDORSEMENTS FOR MR. SEIPEL

```
6 6
    As a board member, Ken is always prepared, challenges
        management appropriately, is strategic and most
    importantly, understands the role of the board. As our
Nom/Gov chairman, Ken has brought a new set of standards
    and rigor to how we govern the company. He would be a
        terrific candidate for any board that could get him."

Peter Sachse, Executive Chairman of Citi Trends (NASDAQ: CTRN)

\section*{66}

As the CEO and director of Gabe's, he inherited a lethargic business with lack luster performance. He quickly assessed the root cause issues, reengaged many quality long time employees, leveraged his apparel knowledge and talent , developed a clear and concise strategy and quickly delivered results.

Kurt Kaul, Chairman of Gabriel Brothers, Inc. (n/k/a Gabe's) and Managing Partner of Alvarez \& Marsal Capital Partners

\section*{CRAIG M. YOUNG}

We believe Mr. Young's strong real estate investment, mergers and acquisitions and capital markets experience can help the Board evaluate sale opportunities or optimize the Company's real estate relative to a new strategic, operational and financial plan.

- Founder and Managing Principal of Tidewater Capital, LLC, a real estate private equity firm with approximately \(\$ 1\) billion of assets under management.
- President of Chain of Lakes Capital, Inc., a venture investing platform.
- Previously worked at JBG Companies, LLC (n/k/a JBG SMITH Properties) (NYSE: JBGS), a property investment company, Sembler Investments, a diversified real estate investment and development company, and Deutsche Bank AG (NYSE: DB).
- Holds a B.A. from Brown University and an M.B.A from Harvard Business School.
\[
\begin{aligned}
& 66 \text { Craig is a natural leader. [...] He has a unique balance of } \\
& \text { someone who is both highly empathetic, while also remaining } \\
& \text { unafraid of being decisive. And before he reacts, he listens. } \\
& \text { Not only has this disposition served him well in building a } \\
& \text { leading fund management business from scratch, it also will } \\
& \text { allow him to be a constructive Board member." }
\end{aligned}
\]

Alex Cheek, Managing Director of Goldman Sachs

\section*{66 \\ Craig is a unique entrepreneur in the real estate industry combining a thoughtful and patient approach to investment decision-making with a visionary approach to leadership and a knack for creative problem solving. He has successfully grown his business from a mere idea in 2013 to a legitimate platform with a stellar track record.}

\section*{66}

Craig's most admirable quality is his steadfast commitment to the value that relationships are the bedrock of a successful business and a fulfilling life.

From CEOs and politicians to strangers he encounters in his day-to-day, Craig always finds the time and exhibits the empathy and curiosity needed to foster a genuine connection.

\footnotetext{
Ross Stackhouse, Principal of Tidewater Capital
}

Matt Kelly, CEO of JBG SMITH Properties

OUR STRATEGY \& PLAN

\section*{superior standalone operating PLAN}

With a meaningfully enhanced Board and management configuration and an improved culture, we believe Kohl's can be a leading destination for value-conscious shoppers and regain market share


DECREASE AND LEVERAGE SG\&A COSTS

IMPROVE CAPITAL
ALIGN EXECUTIVE
ALLOCATION
COMPENSATION

\section*{KOHL'S HAS TREMENDOUS VALUE CREATION POTENTIAL}

We firmly believe that low single-digit sales growth, margin expansion and share repurchases can lead to annual EPS of approximately \(\$ 14.77\) and unlock significant shareholder value within the next few years

Macellum 3-YR Plan without a Sale Leaseback


\section*{SUMMARY OF KOHL'S ESTIMATED FUTURE FINANCIALS IF MACELLUM'S PLAN IS UNDERTAKEN}
- Macellum's operating plan projects low-single sales growth, 30 bps of gross margin expansion and 90 bps of SG\&A leverage driving EBIT margins to 10\%
- \(\$ 6.3\) billion of operating cash flow driven by operations and inventory turn improvement ( 0.65 x )
- \(\$ 3.0\) billion of share repurchases
- \(\$ 2.5\) billion of capex
- \$638 million of dividends
- Ending cash of \(\$ 1.828\) billion (after repurchases)
- Share repurchases of 40 million are conservatively planned at an average price of \(\$ 75\)
\begin{tabular}{|c|c|c|c|c|c|}
\hline \multicolumn{6}{|l|}{\$ in millions except for percentages} \\
\hline Income Statement Analysis & 2021A & 2022E & 2023E & 2024E & 21-24E \\
\hline Total Sales & \$18,471 & 18,910 & 19,477 & 20,061 & 9\% \\
\hline Credit Income & \$962 & 984 & 1,009 & 1,034 & 7\% \\
\hline Total Revenue & \$19,433 & \$19,894 & \$20,486 & \$21,095 & 9\% \\
\hline \% Growth & 21.8\% & 2.4\% & 3.0\% & 3.0\% & \\
\hline Gross Profit & \$7,034 & \$7,015 & \$7,352 & \$7,703 & 10\% \\
\hline Gross Margin \% & 36.2\% & 35.3\% & 35.9\% & 36.5\% & \\
\hline Bps Change & 692 & (93) & 63 & 63 & 32 \\
\hline SG\&A \$ & \$5,478 & \$5,652 & \$5,706 & \$5,760 & 5\% \\
\hline SG\&A \$ Growth & 9.1\% & 3.2\% & 1.0\% & 1.0\% & \\
\hline \% of Sales & 28.2\% & 28.4\% & 27.9\% & 27.3\% & (88) \\
\hline Adj. EBITDA & \$2,518 & \$2,347 & \$2,655 & \$2,977 & 18\% \\
\hline EBITDA Margin & 13.0\% & 11.8\% & 13.0\% & 14.1\% & \\
\hline (-) Depreciation \& Amortization & \$838 & \$860 & \$860 & \$860 & \\
\hline Adj. EBIT & \$1,680 & \$1,487 & \$1,795 & \$2,117 & 26\% \\
\hline EBIT Margin & 8.6\% & 7.5\% & 8.8\% & 10.0\% & \\
\hline (-) Interest Expense & \$260 & \$300 & \$300 & \$300 & \\
\hline Adj. EBT & \$1,420 & \$1,187 & \$1,495 & \$1,817 & 28\% \\
\hline \% Growth & NM & (16.4\%) & 25.9\% & 21.5\% & \\
\hline EPS & \$7.35 & \$7.50 & \$10.81 & \$14.77 & 101\% \\
\hline \% Growth & NM & 2.1\% & 44.2\% & 36.5\% & \\
\hline Shares Outstanding (in thousands) & 148.3 & 120.3 & 105.1 & 93.5 & (37\%) \\
\hline Cash & \$1,587 & \$1,265 & \$1,416 & \$1,828 & 15\% \\
\hline Long-Term Borrowings & \$1,910 & \$1,910 & \$1,910 & \$1,910 & 0\% \\
\hline
\end{tabular}

\section*{KOHL'S COULD HAVE EVEN GREATER EARNINGS POWER IF A SALE LEASEBACK PROVED VIABLE}

Macellum 3-YR Plan with a Sale Leaseback

Macellum's nominees will evaluate a potential sale leaseback transaction to determine its merits

To the extent it proves viable, it is possible that Kohl's could earn substantially more from a sale leaseback

It is worth noting it has been reported that all potential acquirers intend on monetizing Kohl's' owned real estate


\section*{Sales}

Incremental Credi Revenue
 Sourcing \& Optimization

Accretion from Repurchases

Interest
Impact

Tax Delta Share Repurchase Impact
\$11.13
 Leaseback
\$25.90


\section*{100-DAY TRANSITION PLAN}

\section*{Our nominees are ready to implement a strategy to create meaningful shareholder value}
\begin{tabular}{cccc} 
ASSESS & ANALYZE & DEVELOP & IMPLEMENT \\
\(1-4\) WEEKS & \(4-7\) WEEKS & \(7-10\) WEEKS & \(11-14\) WEEKS
\end{tabular}
- Strategic alternatives review
- Leadership culture, talent and org chart
- Customer research
- Merchandise organization
- Merchandise assortment
- Value proposition
- Loyalty programs
- Analytical capabilities
- Sourcing agent
- Supply chain
- Omnichannel profitability
- In-store experience
- Risks
- Analyze strategic alternatives vs. plan
- Sales leaseback potential
- Merchandise plans
- Assortment architecture
- Good, better, best opportunity
- Competitive pricing
- Open-to-buy and on-order
- Loyalty programs
- Supply chain expense
- Promotional stance
- Sephora remodel results
- Payroll analysis
- Return on advertising
- Customer surveys
- New merchandise
- Customer-centricity
- Pricing transparency
- Value proposition
- In-store experience
- Executive compensation
- Online profitability
- Optimal headcount and payroll
- Appropriate advertising spend and channels
- Direct sourcing strategy
- Investor relationship strategy
- Capital allocation plan
- Balance sheet
optimization strategy
- Liability management
- Sale leaseback
- Merchandise architecture
- Value proposition and pricing transparency
- Promotional stance
- Direct sourcing
- Gross margin enhancements
- Marketing plan
- Store service level and associate training
- Distribution center rationalization
- In-store experience
- Ecom profitability
- Omnichannel capabilities
- Rent reduction
- Cost cutting

\section*{MEANINGFULLY GROW SALES}

In our view, Kohl's has a significant opportunity to improve sales and recapture a decade of lost market share by focusing on the following initiatives
- Customer-centricity - take a comprehensive view of who the customer is and what they want
- Merchandise organization - by increasing buyer agility and nimbleness, Kohl's can respond to trends, increase turn and chase new categories
- Assortment architecture - building a "good, better, best pricing" scheme, editing the assortment to cut down on SKU proliferation and increasing trend awareness can help Kohl's capture more of the customer's wallet
- Value Proposition - Kohl's can establish a winning value proposition by streamlining the myriad of promotions and loyalty program
- In store - Kohl's has a material opportunity to improve the in-store experience by improving and monitoring store standards, developing more competitive ways to display merchandise and enhancing store associates' engagement with customers
- Ecommerce - Ecommerce growth can accelerate growth with initiatives to optimize the site, improve navigation increase customer engagement and streamline the checkout process
- Advertising - improving advertising through better social media engagement, a more efficient use of key word searches and consistent messaging highlighting customer-centricity will increase sales

\section*{INCREASE GROSS MARGIN}

\section*{We believe implementing the following initiatives can lead to meaningful increases in gross margins}
- Turn - increasing inventory turn creates a virtuous cycle of increased newness, higher full-priced selling and lower markdowns
- Distribution center rationalization - as \(30 \%\) of Kohl's' sales have migrated to ecommerce, in our view, the store DC network is meaningfully under optimized
- 3rd-party sourcing agent - we estimate that roughly \(30 \%\) of the assortment is sourced by a sourcing agent. A Company of Kohl's' size should develop in-house sourcing resources at materially lower costs
- Split shipments - improving the fulfillment algorithm and developing more transparent pricing will likely meaningfully reduce split shipments and increase profitability

\section*{DECREASE SG\&A COSTS}

\section*{Implementing the following cost cutting mechanisms will enable margins to increase substantially}
- Corporate costs - embark on a detailed analysis of where cost have increased over the last several years and implement a plan to reduce costs, as well as institute a "zero-based budgeting" approach to planning for the future
- Advertising - rationalizing advertising expending by focusing on the most effective channel to lower costs and/or increasing customer reach
- In-store - initiative a comprehensive analysis of payroll to decrease costs and/or lead to higher service levels and customer engagement
- Non-merchandise cost - use sophisticated procurement agents to complete a study to aggregate purchasing and lower expenses

\section*{IMPROVE CAPITAL ALLOCATION \& OPTIMIZE}

In conjunction with operational improvements, we believe optimizing capital allocation and rationalizing the balance sheet will likely result in significantly higher EPS
- Sale leaseback - evaluating the potential to unlock proceeds from the approximately \(\$ 8\) billion of owned real estate at \(14-15 x\) EBITDA can be significantly accretive when buying back stock trading at \(\sim 4 x\) EBITDA
- Increased repurchases - the Company's strong balance sheet and sale leaseback proceeds could reduce the share count and increase EPS meaningfully from existing free cash flow
- Capital expenditures - taking a bottoms up, project by project approach to capital projects will help ensure that duplication is reduced, spending from finished projects is recaptured and appropriate returns are modeled to result in higher free cash flow
- Working capital - increasing inventory turn to drive a significant increase in cash, sales and margins
- Every \(1 x\) increase in turn releases over \(\$ 600\) million in cash; Kohl's' inventory turns are over \(2.5 x\) below best-inclass operators (e.g., AEO, TJX, ROST and TJX)
- Improving accounts payable to inventory ratio by 10-20\% to make Kohl's comparable to Macy's could generate \$300-\$600 million in cash
- Liability management - embarking on a strategy to consolidate debt maturities and lower coupon as well as rationalize an antiquated indenture will likely lower borrowing costs and increase financial flexibility
- Reduce capital expenditures - embark on a process that scrutinizes every capital expenditure

\section*{WE BELIEVE KOHL'S HAS THE ABILITY FOR 01.02 .03 .04 SUBSTANTIALLY MORE SHARE REPURCHASES \\ Despite its underwhelming three-year plan, Kohl's should generate a significant amount of cash, which can be used to make additional share repurchases. Undertaking a \(\$ 3\) billion share repurchase program could generate EPS 30-35\% higher}

Buying more stock ahead of a turnaround will create significantly more shareholder value
\begin{tabular}{|lccc|}
\hline \$s in millions, except for per share data & & & \\
\hline Cash On Hand & \(\$ 1,587\) & & \\
Operating Cash Flow 2022-2024E & \(\$ 5,302\) & & \\
Capex 2022-2024E & \((\$ 2,500)\) & & \\
\hline Sub-Total & \(\$ 4,389\) & & \\
& & & \\
\hline & \(\$ 1\) bn Repo & \$3bn Repo \(\%\) Change \\
\hline 2024 EPS & \(\$ 8.22\) & \(\$ 10.92\) & \(33 \%\) \\
AWS & 110 & 81 & (27\%) \\
\hline & & & \\
\hline Assumptions: & \(\$ 1,000\) & \(\$ 3,000\) & \\
Repurchase Dollars & \(\$ 55\) & \(\$ 71\) & \\
Avg. Purchase Price & 18.2 & 40.6 & 22.4 \\
\hline Share Repurchases & & & Change \\
\hline
\end{tabular}

Source: Company SEC Filings, Bloomberg LP, Macellum estimates.
Notes: 1. Macellum model used Koh's EPS algorithm and line-item commentary to estimate forecasted line items.

\section*{EVALUATE THE REAL ESTATE OPPORTUNITY}

We believe it is possible for Kohl's to execute a meaningfully accretive sale-leaseback transaction
- Our nominees are committed to evaluating a sale leaseback transaction to determine its merits
- Our estimates, with publicly available information, suggest Kohl's could increase earnings per share by 64\%
- After retiring dividend paying stock, the effective cap rate to extract \(\$ 3.3\) billion of after-tax proceeds is only 3.4\%
- Contrary to the Board's and management's claims, we believe this is a far superior structure that would likely increase Kohl's valuation
- Macellum assumes share repurchases at an average price of \(\$ 54\) resulting in the purchase of approximately 61.1 million shares

\section*{Illustrative \(\$ 4\) Billion Sale-Leaseback of Real Estate}
\begin{tabular}{|c|c|c|c|c|}
\hline \multicolumn{5}{|l|}{\$4bon Sale-Leaseback Transaction} \\
\hline & 2021A & Adj. & Pro Forma & Chg. \\
\hline Sales & 18,471 & 0 & 18,471 & 0\% \\
\hline Credit Income & 962 & 0 & 962 & 0\% \\
\hline Gross Profit & 7,034 & 0 & 7,034 & 0\% \\
\hline Rent Expense & 298 & 280 & 578 & 94\% \\
\hline Other SG\&A & 5,180 & 0 & 5,180 & 0\% \\
\hline Total Operating Expense & 5,478 & 280 & 5,758 & 5\% \\
\hline EBITDA & 2,518 & (280) & 2,238 & (11\%) \\
\hline \% of Revenue & 13.0\% & & 11.5\% & \\
\hline D\&A* & 838 & (80) & 758 & (10\%) \\
\hline EBIT & 1,680 & (200) & 1,480 & (12\%) \\
\hline \% of Revenue & 8.6\% & & 7.6\% & \\
\hline Interest Expense & 260 & 0 & 260 & 0\% \\
\hline EBT & 1,420 & (200) & 1,220 & (14\%) \\
\hline Taxes & 331 & (47) & 284 & (14\%) \\
\hline Tax Rate & 23.3\% & & 23.3\% & \\
\hline Net Income & 1,089 & (153) & 936 & (14\%) \\
\hline EPS \({ }^{1}\) & \$8.47 & \$5.40 & \$13.87 & 64\% \\
\hline Shares Outstanding (10K 3/17/22) & 128.6 & (61) & 67.5 & (48\%) \\
\hline
\end{tabular}

\section*{A SALE LEASEBACK WOULD NOT MATERIALY INCREASE KOHL'S LEVERAGE, ESPECIALLY COMPARED TO PEERS}

The analysis of the merits of entry into a sale leaseback transaction would be a top priority for our nominees
It is worth noting that this is likely why all reported buyers are using proceeds from a sales leaseback to unlock value


\section*{OUR STRATEGY \& PLAN - DETAILS}

\section*{IMPROVED FOCUS ON CUSTOMER CENTRICITY}

Kohl's has a significant opportunity to dominate the middle-income, value-focused segment of consumer families
- The primary target is moderate income, families aged 30-45, with "mom" as the decision-maker
- The secondary target is the "baby boomers" who have shopped with Kohl's since the "90s
- Kohl's can win with customers by "overdelivering on value" and streamlining its pricing message
- Customers must feel like the product quality and price, coupled with a good store or online experience, is consistently better than expected
- Kohl's can focus on a broader selection of items to cover every part of a customer's day and week.
- By following the holiday calendar, Kohl's has an opportunity to participate much more meaningfully in seasonal categories for apparel and home décor
- There is a significant opportunity to focus on ethnically diverse customers, which is a growing portion of the population - particularly at the price points Kohl's caters to
- There is the potential for Kohl's to grow sales by entering new categories that the customer allocates a part of their wallet to like pet, garden and electronics, or a more meaningfully developed self-care department

THROUGH EXIT INTERVIEWS AND CUSTOMER SURVEYS, KOHL'S CAN LEARN A LOT MORE ABOUT HOW THE CUSTOMER IS SPENDING THEIR MONEY AND HOW THEY CAN BETTER SERVE ALL OF THE CUSTOMERS' NEEDS

\section*{IMPROVED FOCUS ON CUSTOMER CENTRICITY (CONT.)}

Kohl's' store locations and market position as a middle-income price value retailer provides a significant opportunity to appeal to Caucasian, Latinx, African American and Asian families

\section*{Racial minority groups are growing at a} rapid rate in the U.S.
\begin{tabular}{|c|c|c|}
\hline \multicolumn{2}{|c|}{\begin{tabular}{c} 
Population Mix \\
as of 2020 Census
\end{tabular}} & \begin{tabular}{c} 
Percent \\
Growth
\end{tabular} \\
\hline Caucasian & \(59.7 \%\) & \(-0.1 \%\) \\
\hline Latinx/Hispanic & \(18.6 \%\) & \(+10.1 \%\) \\
\hline Black & \(12.6 \%\) & \(+3.8 \%\) \\
\hline Asian/Others & \(9.1 \%\) & \(+2.9 \%\) \\
\hline
\end{tabular}

\section*{Younger generations are more diverse}


\section*{DEVELOP BRAND STRENGTHS TO WIN VS. COMPETITION \\ We believe Kohl's can develop strong, defensible, repeatable strengths to pull ahead of the competition}

\section*{VARIOUS KOHL'S' COMPETITORS \& PEERS ACROSS RETAIL SECTORS}


\section*{IMPROVE MERCHANDISING ASSORTMENT PLANNING \& ALLOCATION}

\section*{Kohl's often "plans to fail" by purchasing beyond demand, redundant purchases and poor allocation}

Correct the Company from "overbuying" relative to customers' demand. This will lead to more edited assortments and less duplication and redundancy as well as lower amounts of excess and unneeded product

Increase turn to lower markdowns, which will result in higher gross margins
Reduce the abundance of similar items by breaking down the silos within the product development teams

Develop a plan to consistently execute opening price points for basic products as well as a "good, better, best" pricing architecture

Reduce reliance on celebrity brand products, which have high royalty payments and significant minimum, long-term contracts and can result in costly markdowns as such celebrity partnerships lose popularity

Allocating by store and by department will reduce imbalances and lower markdowns

\section*{DEVELOP A FASTER, MORE EFFICEINT BUYING PROCESS}

\section*{A more agile product buying processes with reduced lead times will allow merchants to make better decision closer to the customers' purchasing point}
1. Streamline the purchasing and decision-making process by removing silos and mid-level decision makers
2. Eliminate days from the decision-making calendar
3. Reduce the amount of time product spends getting to the stores
4. Develop a program with domestic fashion vendors to allow buyers to test and quickly react to trends
5. Develop in-house private label sourcing to eliminate steps that add time and increase costs


\section*{IMPROVE PLANNING AND ALLOCATION TO PRIORITIZE INCREASING INVENTORY TURN}
\(x\) Challenge: We believe that the lack of rigorous and detailed analytical planning and allocation creates meaningful amounts of excess inventory and product imbalances, leading to lower realized prices, significant markdowns and lower gross margins
\(\checkmark\) Opportunity: Enhancing the planning and allocation process to increase turns and limit the amount of excess purchasing will result in lower clearance, higher realized prices and increasing gross margins

(O)
target



\section*{IMPROVE PRICING CLARITY}

\section*{Relatively similar items on the same fixture should have consistent prices}
x Challenge: We believe there is no clear promotion strategy on essentials items like t-shirts
\(\checkmark\) Opportunity: Clear value proposition for essentials like t-shirts. Target is confident it knows what price moves a core basic item like t-shirts
\(\checkmark\) Opportunity: Ability to have clearer, more pronounced signage as well as have more signage that displays outfitting

\section*{KOFLS}


(O)
target


\section*{IMPROVE PRICING CLARITY}

Kohl's can regain its reputation as a retailer providing great values by having sharp prices on ubiquitous items and by ensuring that Kohl's has "opening price points" for basic products


\section*{KOHL'S HAS AN OPPORTUNITY TO INSTITUE A "GOOD, BETTER, BEST" PRICING ARCHITECUTRE}
x Challenge: We believe Kohl's does not have a compelling value proposition around "good, better, best" pricing for many items. Here we focused on a basic product like denim. They have their private label Sonoma Jeans listed for the same price as the National Brand Gloria Vanderbilt "Amanda Jeans"
\(\checkmark\) Opportunity: Create a "good, better, best pricing" scheme, editing the assortment to cut down on SKU proliferation and increasing trend awareness can help Kohl's capture more of the customer's wallet


\section*{IMPROVE THE IN-STORE EXPERIENCE BY ENSURING PRODUCTS ARE APPROPRIATELY SIGNED}
x Challenge: We believe Kohl's lacks the in-store controls to ensure products are properly labeled. Pictured below is the wrong \(\$ 24\) dollar Nike product listed for \(\$ 100\). This is not an isolated event, as evidenced by the next slide
\(\checkmark\) Opportunity: Improve store standards and communication with the field to ensure signage is a priority

конгs

CO FREE SHIPPING wime


Men's Nike Pro Dri-FIT \(1 / 4\)-Zip Hyper Dry Training Pullover



What the actual product is
\(\$ 44.99\) sale

\(\qquad\)

SIZE PLEASE CHOOSE A SIZE




Sustainable Materials
Nike Sportswear Windrunner Men's Hooded Jacket
\$100


\section*{INACCURATE SIGNAGE IS NOT AN ISOLATED INCIDENT}
x Challenge: We believe that throughout Kohl's stores, digital displays often represent the wrong product, confusing the customer and leading to a subpar in-store experience
\(\checkmark\) Opportunity: Develop store grading tools that prioritize signage

"Easter Candy Chocolate"?

"Straight Leg Jeans"?

‘Long Sleeve Cropped Polos"?
 Jeans"?

\section*{IMPROVE IN-STORE SIGNAGE}
x Challenge: We believe Kohl's' signage often lacks energy and excitement. This sign for "women's plus" does not create a positive image for this vital and growing customer base
\(\checkmark\) Opportunity: Create signage with positive energy and enthusiasm for every category
cotiss


OLD NAVY



Old Navy calls its plus line "BOD Equality," using inclusive models to romanticize the department

\section*{IMPROVE IN-STORE SIGNAGE}

\section*{Kohl's has an easy yet meaningful opportunity to enhance the customer shopping experience}
x Challenge: We believe store standards are not enforced. Signs for accessories should not bring customers to ladies' clearance section. This would clearly frustrate a shopper trying to navigate a 70,000 square foot store
\(\checkmark\) Opportunity: Create energy and excitement with in-store displays and store roadmaps

KOHES

target


\section*{IMPROVE THE IN-STORE EXPERIENCE}
x Challenge: We believe that Kohl's does not display product in a manner that entices or excites customers
\(\checkmark\) Opportunity: Develop a more robust mannequin program where Kohl's can showcase great product and offer ideas for outfitting


OLD NAVY


\section*{IMPROVE THE IN-STORE EXPERIENCE (CONT.)}
x Challenge: We believe Kohl's' presentation of a key initiative is not as competitive as peers'. Further, excessive clearance drowns out the display of two essential brands. Customers could mistakenly assume this is a Nike and Under Armor clearance section and not enter the area
\(\checkmark\) Opportunity: Develop inviting departments that offer a competitive experience in must-win categories and reduce clearance

\section*{KOLES}
\[
\text { I] } \mathrm{BK}
\]


\section*{IMPROVE THE IN-STORE EXPERIENCE}

Kohl's has an easy opportunity to fix its store presentation
x Challenge: We believe Kohl's does not consistently display product in an inviting manner
\(\checkmark\) Opportunity: For example, a broad selection of well-presented handbags in \(\sim 1500\) square feet

KOHES



\section*{KOHL'S HAS AN OPPORTUNITY TO HAVE A BROADER OFFERING IN MANY CATEGORIES}
x Challenge: We believe that Kohl's does not have a compelling seasonal offering. The selection is so sparse that we believe shoppers don't consider Kohl's for their seasonal needs nor do shoppers feel like Kohl's is presenting the best the world has to offer
\(\checkmark\) Opportunity: Create a robust and competitive offering for each season to cater to customers' lifestyle year-round


○
target


Kohl's' shallow Easter offering is not an isolated event in one store. The assortment is very similar in the two different stores above. We have witnessed this throughout the chain.

\section*{KOHL'S HAS AN OPPORTUNITY TO HAVE A BROADER OFFERING IN MANY CATEGORIES}
x Challenge: We believe Kohl's has not consistently deployed competitive queue lines
\(\checkmark\) Opportunity: Best-in-class queue lines provide shoppers with high margin impulse-buy items and unique discoveries as they check out, especially if there is a line

\section*{KOFIEs}



\section*{Marshalls}


\section*{KOHL'S HAS AN OPPORTUNITY TO HAVE A BROADER OFFERING IN MANY CATEGORIES}
x Challenge: We believe that once Kohl's reduces duplication and increases turn it will open up space for additional categories
\(\checkmark\) Opportunity: Create a robust and competitive offering for shopping beyond core apparel offering that also drives foot traffic
target


\section*{Marshalls}



\section*{KOHL'S HAS AN OPPORTUNITY TO HAVE A BROADER OFFERING IN MANY CATEGORIES}

Kohl's' competitors have found innovative ways to educate customers and enhance their shopping experience
x Challenge: We believe Kohl's is missing opportunities to communicate and educate customers
\(\checkmark\) Opportunity: Call out trends and new items to help customer understand Kohl's' point of view


target



\section*{REASSESS THIRD-PARTY SOURCING MODEL}

\section*{PRIVATE}

We believe removing the middleman could improve total margins at Kohl's by 40 to 60 basis points or \$81 to \(\$ 117 \mathrm{~mm}\), even after considering new supply chain costs
- Macellum estimates that sourcing products through domestic vendors could see average unit cost decline by \(\sim 3 \%\) to \(\sim 4 \%\), resulting in meaningful savings
- Some savings will be offset by building out additional capabilities to support direct sourcing
\begin{tabular}{|lr|}
\hline \multicolumn{2}{|c|}{\begin{tabular}{c} 
Size of Sourcing Improvement \\
Opportunity
\end{tabular}} \\
\hline \hline Total Sales & 18,910 \\
Total COGS & 11,819 \\
\hline Private Brand Penetration & \(30 \%\) \\
Private Brand COGS & 3,546 \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\begin{tabular}{|l|c|c|}
\hline \multicolumn{3}{|c|}{ Gross Margin Uplift } \\
\hline \hline & Low & High \\
\hline 3rd Party Cost Reduction & \(3.0 \%\) & \(4.0 \%\) \\
3rd Party Profit Recapture & 106 & 142 \\
& & \\
New Supply Chain Costs & \((25)\) & \((25)\) \\
\hline Net Product Cost Savings & \(\$ 81\) & \(\$ 117\) \\
Gross Margin Impact & 43 & 62 \\
\hline
\end{tabular}

\section*{RATIONALIZE EXCESS DISTRIBUTION CAPACITY}

Rationalizing the distribution network could increase operating margins by 20 to 45 basis points, leading to \(\$ 45-\$ 90\) million in additional income
- As ecommerce penetration has increased to \(30 \%\) of total sales, in-store sales have fallen by the comparable amount
- Kohl's has built six ecommerce fulfillment centers while leaving the store network in place. As a result, the store fulfilment network significantly is under-optimized and is likely processing 30\% fewer units
\begin{tabular}{|lrr|}
\hline Distribution Savings: & & \\
\hline \$s in Millions & 2021A & 2021A \\
\hline Current Distribution Costs & \(\$ 449.00\) & \(\$ 449.00\) \\
& & \\
\hline \% of Distribution Costs Saved & \(10 \%\) & \(20 \%\) \\
\hline Dollar Savings & \(\$ 44.90\) & \(\$ 89.80\) \\
\hline Bps to Operating Margin & \(\mathbf{2 3}\) & \(\mathbf{4 6}\) \\
\hline
\end{tabular}

\section*{STRENGTHEN ECOMMERCE OPERATIONS}

Kohl's should transition beyond omnichannel and develop a "multichannel" platform that fully integrates the store experience, the digital experience and social media

Putting the customer at the center of our strategy:

\section*{Commerce}

Requires Inspiration
Inspiration requires Content

Content requires
Communities
- Easy and fun content
- Informative
- Pre-built integrations
- Presentation layer
- Localization
- Multi-channel delivery


\section*{CONCLUSION}

Our plan to create meaningful shareholder value at Kohl's can only be implemented if a majority of the Board is changed

> VOTE ON THE WHITE PROXY CARD FOR OUR FULL SLATE


WWW.KEEPKOHLSACCOUNTABLE.COM

\section*{4}


APPENDIX

\section*{THE CURRENT BOARD HAS LOST CREDIBILITY (CONT.)}

\section*{Kohl's has misrepresented several key facts pertaining to its performance and Macellum's campaign for change}
x MYTH: "Macellum's involvement has contributed to value destruction"
x MYTH: One of Macellum's former activist campaigns, Citi Trends has a one-year TSR of (67\%) this year

MYTH: Macellum is short-term-focused
x MYTH: Mr. Duskin was critical of the Board rejecting an offer to buy the Company at \(\$ 64\) per share
\(\checkmark\) THE REALITY: Big Lots, Bed Bath and Beyond and Citi Trends have all seen a material increase in value since Macellum nominees or Mr. Duskin joined the boards of each company
\(\checkmark\) THE REALITY: The earnings for Citi Trends and Big Lots have increased \(659 \%\) and \(48 \%\) ( \(100 \%+\) before Macellum representative was kicked off), respectively, since Macellum began its engagement. Bed Bath and Beyond was able to monetize \(\$ 750\) million in non-core asset sales and paid down \$298 million in debt
\(\checkmark\) THE REALITY: Kohl's is misleading investors by attempting to cherry pick irrelevant time frames. Citi Trends' stock is up 80\% since Mr. Duskin joined the board
\(\checkmark\) THE REALITY: Macellum has been an investor in Citi Trends for more than five years
\(\checkmark\) THE REALITY: Mr. Duskin was critical of the Board's hasty rejection of the offer without any attempt to achieve a higher price

\section*{THE CURRENT BOARD HAS LOST CREDIBILITY (CONT.)}

Kohl's has misrepresented several key facts pertaining to its performance and Macellum's campaign for change
x MYTH: Mr. Duskin stated publicly that Kohl's was worth \$100
x MYTH: "Half the Macellum slate has close personal ties to Mr. Duskin"
\(\checkmark\) THE REALITY: Mr. Duskin stated clearly that with the majority of the Board reconstituted and the correct Board and management configuration, the stock could increase in value to \$100 over time
\(\checkmark\) THE REALITY: Mr. Duskin served on the Citi Trends board with Mr. Seipel. Ms. Edwards was Citi Trends' CFO, however, has since retired. Both are independent and clearly do not constitute 50\% of the eight other candidates on Macellum's slate

\section*{ADDITIONAL SLIDES HIGHLIGHTING MACELLUM'S VALUE CREATION CAN BE FOUND HERE \(\rightarrow\)}

\section*{CITI TRENDS}

\section*{CITI TRENDS, INC. - MACELLUM CREATING VALUE}

\section*{Overview}

In 2017, Macellum engaged with Citi Trends because we believed the company had not taken full advantage of the significant opportunities to increase its profitability. The board had failed to deliver value to its stockholders and the vast majority of the Company's underperformance was the result of a flawed strategy driving declining operating metrics, erratic results, poor capital allocation and poor corporate governance

\section*{Our Suggestions}
\(\checkmark\) Increase inventory turns
\(\checkmark\) Increase size of share repurchases
\(\checkmark\) Improve the Company's merchandising strategy
\(\checkmark\) Reallocate capital expenditure to improve the
Company's systems
\(\checkmark\) Increase store growth

\section*{Our Impact \& Value Creation}
\(\checkmark\) Macellum placed six new directors on the company's board, including three Black women, and conducted an overhaul of the management team
\(\checkmark\) Citi Trends' TSR is up \(80 \%^{1}\) since Mr. Duskin joined the board in May 2017

EARNINGS FOR CITI TRENDS INCREASED 659\% SINCE MACELLUM BEGAN ENGAGING

\section*{BED, BATH \& BEYOND INC. - MACELLUM CREATING VALUE}

\section*{Overview}

In 2019, Macellum observed that Bed, Bath \& Beyond was not realizing its true potential. At the time, our goal was to embark upon a significant turnaround and a more profitable and better capitalized company in which to invest

\section*{Our Suggestions}
\(\checkmark\) Revamp executive management \(\checkmark\) Implement cost cutting
\(\checkmark\) Divest non-core businesses and monetize real estate
\(\checkmark\) Improve inventory
\(\checkmark\) Increase supply chain efficiency
\(\checkmark\) Fix capital allocation

\section*{Our Impact \& Value Creation}
\(\checkmark\) The campaign resulted in the appointment of nine of 12 new directors, including four Macellum nominees, and a completely new management team
\(\checkmark\) Bed, Bath \& Beyond sold non-cores assets equal to approximately 75\% of the company's market capitalization and paid down \(\$ 298\) million in debt
\(\checkmark\) The new management team embarked on a massive transformation projecting to earn \(\$ 1\) billion of EBITDA by 2023

\section*{BIG LOTS, INC. - MACELLUM CREATING VALUE}

\section*{Overview}

In 2020, Macellum observed that Big Lots' board had overseen poor operations and ineffective capital allocation strategies and failed to optimize the company's balance sheet, including monetizing the company's real estate. The company's continued earnings decline was of equal concern, as both operating income and margins had decreased significantly.

\section*{Our Suggestions \& Strategy}
\(\checkmark\) Increase Cash Flow Generation via disciplined capital allocation, increased inventory turns and working capital management
\(\checkmark\) Monetize \$1 Billion real estate assets
\(\checkmark\) Improve fundamentals through operational excellence

\section*{Our Impact \& Value Creation}
\(\checkmark\) In a negotiated settlement, Big Lots appointed three independent directors (including Macellum representative Aaron Goldstein) to the Board and created a new capital allocation planning committee
\(\checkmark\) Big Lots agreed to sell owned real estate for \(\$ 725\) million or roughly an amount equal to its market capitalization
\(\checkmark\) Big Lots' TSR was up 135\% during the time Macellum's representative was on the Board \({ }^{1}\)

SINCE MACELLUM BEGAN OUR ENGAGEMENT, BIG LOTS' EARNINGS INCREASED 48\% AND OVER 100\% UP TO THE POINT WHEN THE MACELLUM REPRESENTATIVE RESIGNED

\section*{100-DAY PLAN DETAILS - ASSESSMENT OF PEOPLE \& CULTURE}
\begin{tabular}{|c|c|c|c|c|c|c|c|c|c|c|c|c|c|c|c|c|c|c|c|c|}
\hline \multicolumn{21}{|c|}{HUMAN RESOURCES} \\
\hline & & \multicolumn{14}{|c|}{Week} & \multicolumn{3}{|c|}{Quarters} & \multicolumn{2}{|r|}{Year 2} \\
\hline & Pre-Vote & 1 & 2 & 3 & 4 & 5 & 6 & 7 & 8 & 9 & 10 & 11 & 12 & 13 & 14 & \[
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\hline \multicolumn{21}{|l|}{Human Resources} \\
\hline \multicolumn{21}{|l|}{Leadership} \\
\hline \multicolumn{21}{|l|}{Establish strategic alternatives review committee of directors} \\
\hline \multicolumn{21}{|l|}{Assess senior leadership team} \\
\hline \multicolumn{21}{|l|}{Assess skill set of merchandising department} \\
\hline \multicolumn{21}{|l|}{Establish swat teams of directors to oversee execution} \\
\hline \multicolumn{21}{|l|}{Establish committee of directors to oversee succession planning} \\
\hline \multicolumn{21}{|l|}{Engage top executive search firm to orchestrate talent upgrade} \\
\hline \multicolumn{21}{|l|}{Employee Talent/Engagement} \\
\hline \multicolumn{21}{|l|}{Listening / Feedback sessions} \\
\hline \multicolumn{21}{|l|}{Talent Assessment} \\
\hline \multicolumn{21}{|l|}{Determine at risk employees} \\
\hline \multicolumn{21}{|l|}{Assess organizational chart and reporting lines} \\
\hline \multicolumn{21}{|l|}{Evaluate case for addition by subtraction} \\
\hline \multicolumn{21}{|l|}{Develop plan to more closely integrate organization} \\
\hline \multicolumn{21}{|l|}{Incentive compensation} \\
\hline \multicolumn{21}{|l|}{Assess existing plan at corporate and field} \\
\hline \multicolumn{21}{|l|}{Develop plan to align compensation with profitability and shareholders} \\
\hline \multicolumn{21}{|l|}{Assess risks to new plan} \\
\hline \multicolumn{21}{|l|}{Implement plan} \\
\hline \multicolumn{21}{|l|}{Communication} \\
\hline \multicolumn{21}{|l|}{Develop internal communication plan} \\
\hline \multicolumn{21}{|l|}{Solicit input from senior leadership team} \\
\hline \multicolumn{21}{|l|}{Assess plan} \\
\hline \multicolumn{21}{|l|}{Disseminate plan to senior leadership team} \\
\hline \multicolumn{21}{|l|}{Disseminate plan to entire organization} \\
\hline \multicolumn{21}{|l|}{Investor relations} \\
\hline \multicolumn{21}{|l|}{Assess existing communication strategy} \\
\hline \multicolumn{21}{|l|}{Engage with shareholders to assess desire to remain public or sell} \\
\hline \multicolumn{21}{|l|}{Quantify initiatives} \\
\hline \multicolumn{21}{|l|}{Create road map to create shareholder value} \\
\hline \multicolumn{21}{|l|}{Develop plan for guidance} \\
\hline \multicolumn{21}{|l|}{Develop plan for investor day as go-foreward public entity} \\
\hline Investor day as go-foreward public entity & & & & & & & & & & & & & & & & & & & & \\
\hline
\end{tabular}

\section*{100-DAY PLAN DETAILS - SHOPPING EXPERIENCE: SALES OPPORTUNITY}

MERCHANDISE STRATEGY
\begin{tabular}{|c|c|c|c|c|c|c|c|c|c|c|c|c|c|c|c|c|c|c|c|c|}
\hline \multicolumn{21}{|c|}{MERCHANDISE STRATEGY} \\
\hline & & \multicolumn{14}{|c|}{Week} & \multicolumn{3}{|c|}{Quarters} & \multicolumn{2}{|r|}{Year 2} \\
\hline & Pre-Vote & 1 & 2 & 3 & 4 & 5 & 6 & 7 & 8 & 9 & 10 & 11 & 12 & 13 & 14 & \[
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\hline \multicolumn{21}{|l|}{Merchandise Strategy} \\
\hline \multicolumn{21}{|l|}{Organizational speed and nimbleness} \\
\hline \multicolumn{21}{|l|}{Assess decision making process} \\
\hline \multicolumn{21}{|l|}{Develop plan to reduce decision making timeline} \\
\hline \multicolumn{21}{|l|}{Develop plan to reduce weeks in the buying process} \\
\hline \multicolumn{21}{|l|}{Good, better, best hierarchy} \\
\hline \multicolumn{21}{|l|}{Analyze pricing, features and benefits} \\
\hline \multicolumn{21}{|l|}{Implement changes to open to buy plan} \\
\hline \multicolumn{21}{|l|}{Test new hierarchy in key categories} \\
\hline \multicolumn{21}{|l|}{Realize benefits} \\
\hline \multicolumn{21}{|l|}{SKU rationalization} \\
\hline \multicolumn{21}{|l|}{Assess choice counts and redundancy} \\
\hline \multicolumn{21}{|l|}{Analyze SKU productivity and profitability} \\
\hline \multicolumn{21}{|l|}{Analyze category profitability} \\
\hline \multicolumn{21}{|l|}{Develop new merchandising plan} \\
\hline \multicolumn{21}{|l|}{Develop plan for test stores} \\
\hline \multicolumn{21}{|l|}{Implement changes} \\
\hline \multicolumn{21}{|l|}{Realize benefits} \\
\hline \multicolumn{21}{|l|}{Vendor Assessment} \\
\hline \multicolumn{21}{|l|}{Listening tour} \\
\hline \multicolumn{21}{|l|}{Assess capabilities, performance and profitability} \\
\hline \multicolumn{21}{|l|}{Develop tactical plan for better economics} \\
\hline \multicolumn{21}{|l|}{Implement changes} \\
\hline \multicolumn{21}{|l|}{Realize benefits} \\
\hline \multicolumn{21}{|l|}{Assess risk} \\
\hline \multicolumn{21}{|l|}{Assess aged inventory} \\
\hline \multicolumn{21}{|l|}{Assess in house capabilities} \\
\hline \multicolumn{21}{|l|}{Determine amount of clearance generated} \\
\hline \multicolumn{21}{|l|}{Develop strategy to clear exited programs} \\
\hline \multicolumn{21}{|l|}{Identify optimal clearance strategy of non-go forward product} \\
\hline \multicolumn{21}{|l|}{Test and React} \\
\hline \multicolumn{21}{|l|}{Determine speed categories} \\
\hline \multicolumn{21}{|l|}{Develop vendor resources to implement a test and reaction program} \\
\hline \multicolumn{21}{|l|}{Test categories for test and react plan} \\
\hline Implement test and react plan & & & & & & & & & & & & & & & & & & & & \\
\hline
\end{tabular}

\section*{100-DAY PLAN DETAILS - SHOPPING EXPERIENCE: SALES OPPORTUNITY}

MERCHANDISE STRATEGY
\begin{tabular}{|c|c|c|c|c|c|c|c|c|c|c|c|c|c|c|c|c|c|c|c|}
\hline & \multicolumn{14}{|c|}{Week} & \multicolumn{3}{|c|}{Quarters} & \multicolumn{2}{|c|}{Year 2} \\
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Fashion
Assess organizational capabilities
Assess categories with highest need for improved fashion Develop plan to assess fahion
Develop plan to chase fashioin
Develop plan to deliver better and more appropriate fashion Test plan to deliver more fashion
Implement plan to deliver more fashion
National Brands and Celebrity Product
Analyze pricing, contracts, obligations, and benefits
Assess capabilities, performance and profitability
Implement changes
Test new hierarchy in key categories
Realize benefits
Develop opening price points
Analyze competitor prices
Establish must win categories
Establish supplier capabilities
Implement changes to plan
Realize benefits


\section*{100-DAY PLAN DETAILS - SHOPPING EXPERIENCE: SALES OPPORTUNITY}


\section*{100-DAY PLAN DETAILS - VALUE PROPOSITION AND MERCHANDISE MARGIN}

\section*{VALUE PROPOSITION AND MERCHANDISE MARGIN}

\section*{Value Proposition and Merchandise Margin}

Pricing
Conduct competitive pricing analysis
Analyze SKU profitability and sell through at different discounts
Develop plan to streamline promotional offerings
Develop plan to increase full price selling
Develop plan for pricing transpareny
Test new pricing scheme
Implement changes
Loyalty programs
Assess varios loyalty plans and interaction with promotional discounts
Develop plan to streamline loyalty plans
Implement test of new loyalty plans
Develop membershp plan
Test membership plan
Implement promotional and loyalty plans
Promotional stance
Comprehensive marketing/promotional discount analysis
Analyze Kohl's cash usage and profitabilty impact
Determine impact on SKU profitability
Determine optimal percent off rates and points
Analyze Kohl's cash relationship with initial mark up's Analyze instances overlapping offers
Develop and implement changes
Clearance
Assess clearance and relationship to order quantities
Assess clearance generated by SKU rationalization
Analyze amount of clearance created historically
Determine potential for increased turn/reduce clearance
Develop plan to reduce clearance and increase full price selling
Implement plan
Realize benefits

\section*{100-DAY PLAN DETAILS - IN STORE EXPERIENCE}
\begin{tabular}{|c|c|c|c|c|c|c|c|c|c|c|c|c|c|c|c|c|c|c|c|c|}
\hline \multicolumn{21}{|c|}{IN STORE EXPERIENCE} \\
\hline & & \multicolumn{14}{|c|}{Week} & \multicolumn{3}{|c|}{Quarters} & \multicolumn{2}{|r|}{Year 2} \\
\hline & Pre-Vote & 1 & 2 & 3 & 4 & 5 & 6 & 7 & 8 & 9 & 10 & 11 & 12 & 13 & 14 & \[
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\hline In Store Experience & & \multicolumn{19}{|l|}{} \\
\hline \multicolumn{21}{|l|}{Remodeled stores} \\
\hline \multicolumn{21}{|l|}{Asses current results of remodel program} \\
\hline \multicolumn{21}{|l|}{Systematize testing in test stores} \\
\hline \multicolumn{21}{|l|}{Assess impact of Sephora} \\
\hline \multicolumn{21}{|l|}{Determine optimal remodel strategy} \\
\hline \multicolumn{21}{|l|}{Test strategy} \\
\hline \multicolumn{21}{|l|}{Implement changes} \\
\hline \multicolumn{21}{|l|}{Vignettes} \\
\hline \multicolumn{21}{|l|}{Determine best categories for improved display} \\
\hline \multicolumn{21}{|l|}{Determine vendor capabilities to support changes} \\
\hline \multicolumn{21}{|l|}{Establish vendor partners to fund displays} \\
\hline \multicolumn{21}{|l|}{Determine other categories with most potential} \\
\hline \multicolumn{21}{|l|}{Develop visual display with curated product} \\
\hline \multicolumn{21}{|l|}{Signage} \\
\hline \multicolumn{21}{|l|}{Assess categories to benefit from life style representation} \\
\hline \multicolumn{21}{|l|}{Assess signage for store road maps} \\
\hline \multicolumn{21}{|l|}{Develop in-store collateral} \\
\hline \multicolumn{21}{|l|}{Develop new in-store POS signs to support updated good, better best product and promotional strategies.} \\
\hline \multicolumn{21}{|l|}{Test new visual} \\
\hline \multicolumn{21}{|l|}{Roll out to stores} \\
\hline \multicolumn{21}{|l|}{Develop strategy to elevate service offering} \\
\hline \multicolumn{21}{|l|}{Assess internal capabilities} \\
\hline \multicolumn{21}{|l|}{Assess sufficiency of payroll hours} \\
\hline \multicolumn{21}{|l|}{Develop plan to deliever elevated service} \\
\hline \multicolumn{21}{|l|}{Test plan} \\
\hline \multicolumn{21}{|l|}{Implement plan} \\
\hline \multicolumn{21}{|l|}{Realize benefits} \\
\hline \multicolumn{21}{|l|}{Store associate training and certification} \\
\hline \multicolumn{21}{|l|}{Assess in store talent and performance evaluations} \\
\hline \multicolumn{21}{|l|}{Assess training and evaluation capabilities} \\
\hline \multicolumn{21}{|l|}{Develop robust training platform} \\
\hline Implement new store associate training program & & & & & & & & & & & & & & & & & & & & \\
\hline
\end{tabular}

\section*{100-DAY PLAN DETAILS - WEBSITE AND OMNI CHANNEL}

WEBSITE AND OMNI CHANNEL

Website and Omni channel
Functionality
Evaluate ability and capability of platform(s)
Assess technological capabilities
Assess content and content creation
Develop plan to address weaknesses Implement plan
Realize benefits
Fulfilment Cost
Assess the impact and cause of split shipments
Assess shipping costs and pricing
Assess shipping vs store pick-up and pricing dynamic Develop plan to increase Ecom profitability Implement plan
Integration with stores
Assessment of capabilities
Assess line busting technology/self check out
Develop plan for mobile check out
Develop plan for in store information on mobile devices Implement changes


\section*{100-DAY PLAN DETAILS - MARKETING AND ADVERTISING}


\section*{100-DAY PLAN DETAILS - SUPPLY CHAIN}
\begin{tabular}{|c|c|c|c|c|c|c|c|c|c|c|c|c|c|c|c|c|c|c|c|c|}
\hline \multicolumn{21}{|c|}{SUPPLY CHAIN} \\
\hline & & \multicolumn{14}{|c|}{Week} & \multicolumn{3}{|c|}{Quarters} & \multicolumn{2}{|r|}{Year 2} \\
\hline & Pre-Vote & 1 & 2 & 3 & 4 & 5 & 6 & 7 & 8 & 9 & 10 & 11 & 12 & 13 & 14 & \[
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\] \\
\hline \multicolumn{21}{|l|}{Supply chain} \\
\hline \multicolumn{21}{|l|}{Distribution Center Rationalization} \\
\hline Assess excess capacity in store distribution net work & & & & & & & & & & & & & & & & & & & & \\
\hline \multicolumn{21}{|l|}{Develop a plan to rationalize excess capacity} \\
\hline \multicolumn{21}{|l|}{Implement plan} \\
\hline \multicolumn{21}{|l|}{Direct Sourcing} \\
\hline \multicolumn{21}{|l|}{Assess 3rd party manufacturing} \\
\hline \multicolumn{21}{|l|}{Complete contract review} \\
\hline \multicolumn{21}{|l|}{Determine opportunity to remove cost} \\
\hline \multicolumn{21}{|l|}{Assess sourcing infrastructure and capabilities} \\
\hline \multicolumn{21}{|l|}{Asses risk of sourcing changes} \\
\hline \multicolumn{21}{|l|}{Develop plan for direct sourcing} \\
\hline \multicolumn{21}{|l|}{Implement plan} \\
\hline \multicolumn{21}{|l|}{Realize benefits} \\
\hline \multicolumn{21}{|l|}{Private label} \\
\hline \multicolumn{21}{|l|}{Assess existing programs} \\
\hline \multicolumn{21}{|l|}{Asses risk of sourcing changes} \\
\hline \multicolumn{21}{|l|}{Assess in house design capabilities} \\
\hline \multicolumn{21}{|l|}{Assess ability to implement with direct sourcing} \\
\hline \multicolumn{21}{|l|}{Assess vendor capabilities} \\
\hline \multicolumn{21}{|l|}{Implement plan} \\
\hline \multicolumn{21}{|l|}{Realize benefits} \\
\hline \multicolumn{21}{|l|}{Inventory turn} \\
\hline \multicolumn{21}{|l|}{Assess open to buy process} \\
\hline \multicolumn{21}{|l|}{Determine excess weeks of supply} \\
\hline \multicolumn{21}{|l|}{Assess supply chain changes impact on turn} \\
\hline \multicolumn{21}{|l|}{Determine optimal on hand inventory in stores} \\
\hline \multicolumn{21}{|l|}{Test stores with optimal amount of inventory} \\
\hline \multicolumn{21}{|l|}{Develop plan to increase velocity and flow} \\
\hline Implement plan & & & & & & & & & & & & & & & & & & & & \\
\hline
\end{tabular}

\section*{100-DAY PLAN DETAILS - CORPORATE COST ASSESSMENT}


\section*{100-DAY PLAN DETAILS - STORE PROFITABILITY}
\begin{tabular}{|c|c|c|c|c|c|c|c|c|c|c|c|c|c|c|c|c|c|c|c|c|}
\hline \multicolumn{21}{|c|}{STORE PROFITABILITY} \\
\hline & & \multicolumn{14}{|c|}{Week} & \multicolumn{3}{|c|}{Quarters} & \multicolumn{2}{|r|}{Year 2} \\
\hline & Pre-Vote & 1 & 2 & 3 & 4 & 5 & 6 & 7 & 8 & 9 & 10 & 11 & 12 & 13 & 14 & 2nd
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\] & \[
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\] \\
\hline \multicolumn{21}{|l|}{Store Profitability} \\
\hline \multicolumn{21}{|l|}{Review payroll} \\
\hline \multicolumn{21}{|l|}{Assess payroll expenditure} \\
\hline \multicolumn{21}{|l|}{Assess scheduling and staffing hours} \\
\hline \multicolumn{21}{|l|}{Develop plan for optimal payroll hours and activities} \\
\hline \multicolumn{21}{|l|}{Test increased payroll on customer focused activities} \\
\hline \multicolumn{21}{|l|}{Implement new payroll plan} \\
\hline \multicolumn{21}{|l|}{Incentive compensation program} \\
\hline \multicolumn{21}{|l|}{Assess store compensation plan} \\
\hline \multicolumn{21}{|l|}{Develop incentive comp plan tied to performance} \\
\hline \multicolumn{21}{|l|}{Assess risk of changes to existing plan} \\
\hline \multicolumn{21}{|l|}{Implement incentive compensation plan} \\
\hline \multicolumn{21}{|l|}{Rent reduction on existing leased space} \\
\hline \multicolumn{21}{|l|}{Conduct lease review} \\
\hline \multicolumn{21}{|l|}{Determine opportunity} \\
\hline \multicolumn{21}{|l|}{Develop plan to achieve savings} \\
\hline \multicolumn{21}{|l|}{Implement plan} \\
\hline Realize benefits & & & & & & & & & & & & & & & & & & & & \\
\hline
\end{tabular}

\section*{100-DAY PLAN DETAILS - Capital Allocation and Balance Sheet Rationalization}

\section*{CAPITAL ALLOCATION AND BALANCE SHEET RATIONALIZATION}
\begin{tabular}{|c|c|c|c|c|c|c|c|c|c|c|c|c|c|c|c|c|c|c|c|c|}
\hline & & \multicolumn{14}{|c|}{Week} & \multicolumn{3}{|c|}{Quarters} & \multicolumn{2}{|r|}{Year 2} \\
\hline & Pre-Vote & 1 & 2 & 3 & 4 & 5 & 6 & 7 & 8 & 9 & 10 & 11 & 12 & 13 & 14 & 2nd
Qtr & 3rd
Qtr & \[
\begin{aligned}
& \text { 4th } \\
& \text { Qtr }
\end{aligned}
\] & \[
\underset{\text { Year } 2}{1 H}
\] & \[
\underset{\text { Year } 2}{2 \mathrm{H}}
\] \\
\hline Capital Allocation and Balance Sheet Rationalization & & & & & & & & & & & & & & & & & & & & \\
\hline Sale Leaseback & & & & & & & & & & & & & & & & & & & & \\
\hline Assess owned real estate & & & & & & & & & & & & & & & & & & & & \\
\hline Run competitve process for sale leaseback & & & & & & & & & & & & & & & & & & & & \\
\hline Execute sale leaseback & & & & & & & & & & & & & & & & & & & & \\
\hline Working Capital & & & & & & & & & & & & & & & & & & & & \\
\hline Assess cash generated from higher inventory turns & & & & & & & & & & & & & & & & & & & & \\
\hline Assess ability to increase working capital with better payable terms & & & & & & & & & & & & & & & & & & & & \\
\hline Capital Expenditures & & & & & & & & & & & & & & & & & & & & \\
\hline Evaluate historical spending & & & & & & & & & & & & & & & & & & & & \\
\hline Assess ROIC and accretion of existing plans, particularly Sephora & & & & & & & & & & & & & & & & & & & & \\
\hline Develop bottoms up captial expenditure plan, project by project & & & & & & & & & & & & & & & & & & & & \\
\hline Implement plans to reduce capital expenditures & & & & & & & & & & & & & & & & & & & & \\
\hline Return of Capital to Shareholders & & & & & & & & & & & & & & & & & & & & \\
\hline Analyze dividend vs share repurchase & & & & & & & & & & & & & & & & & & & & \\
\hline Develop plan to repurchase significant amount of shares & & & & & & & & & & & & & & & & & & & & \\
\hline Repurchase stock & & & & & & & & & & & & & & & & & & & & \\
\hline Liability Management & & & & & & & & & & & & & & & & & & & & \\
\hline Assess opportunity to refinance & & & & & & & & & & & & & & & & & & & & \\
\hline Assess opportunity to pay down debt & & & & & & & & & & & & & & & & & & & & \\
\hline Assess opportunity to consolidate maturities & & & & & & & & & & & & & & & & & & & & \\
\hline Comprehensive indenture analysis & & & & & & & & & & & & & & & & & & & & \\
\hline Develop plan to rationalize liabilities and update indenture & & & & & & & & & & & & & & & & & & & & \\
\hline
\end{tabular}

\section*{100-DAY PLAN DETAILS - INFORMATION AND TECHNOLOGY}

INFORMATION AND TECHNOLOGY

\section*{Information and Technology}

Comprehensive review of systems
Assess internal capability
Determine need for further upgrades
Compile and analyze all dash board and summary reports
Develop and implement plan for optimal technological support


\section*{summary of Kohl'S' HISTORICAL FINANCIALS}
\begin{tabular}{|c|c|c|c|c|c|c|c|c|c|c|c|c|}
\hline \multicolumn{13}{|l|}{\$ in millions except for percentages} \\
\hline Income Statement Analysis & 2011A & 2012A & 2013A & 2014A & 2015A & 2016A & 2017A & 2018A & 2019A & 2020A & 2021A & '11-'21 \\
\hline Total Sales & \$18,804 & 19,280 & 19,031 & \$19,023 & \$19,204 & \$18,686 & \$19,036 & \$19,167 & \$18,885 & \$15,031 & \$18,471 & (2\%) \\
\hline Credit Income & - & - & - & - & - & - & \$1,048 & \$1,062 & \$1,089 & \$924 & \$962 & \\
\hline Total Revenue & \$18,804 & \$19,280 & \$19,031 & \$19,023 & \$19,204 & \$18,686 & \$20,084 & \$20,229 & \$19,974 & \$15,955 & \$19,433 & 3\% \\
\hline \% Growth & - & 2.5\% & (1.3\%) & (0.0\%) & 1.0\% & (2.7\%) & 7.5\% & 0.7\% & (1.3\%) & (20.1\%) & 21.8\% & \\
\hline Gross Profit & \$7,179 & \$6,990 & \$6,945 & \$6,925 & \$6,940 & \$6,741 & \$6,859 & \$6,969 & \$6,745 & \$4,671 & \$7,034 & \\
\hline Gross Margin \% & 38.2\% & 36.3\% & 36.5\% & 36.4\% & 36.1\% & 36.1\% & 34.2\% & 34.5\% & 33.8\% & 29.3\% & 36.2\% & \\
\hline Bps Change & - & (192) & 24 & (9) & (26) & (6) & (192) & 30 & (68) & (449) & 692 & (198) \\
\hline SG\&A \$ & \$4,244 & \$4,266 & \$4,312 & \$4,350 & \$4,452 & \$4,434 & \$5,500 & \$5,600 & \$5,705 & \$5,021 & \$5,478 & 29\% \\
\hline SG\&A \$ Growth & - & 0.5\% & 1.1\% & 0.9\% & 2.3\% & (0.4\%) & 24.0\% & 1.8\% & 1.9\% & (12.0\%) & 9.1\% & \\
\hline \% of Sales & 22.6\% & 22.1\% & 22.7\% & 22.9\% & 23.2\% & 23.7\% & 27.4\% & 27.7\% & 28.6\% & 31.5\% & 28.2\% & 562 \\
\hline Adj. EBITDA & \$2,935 & \$2,724 & \$2,633 & \$2,575 & \$2,488 & \$2,307 & \$2,407 & \$2,431 & \$2,129 & \$574 & \$2,518 & (14\%) \\
\hline EBITDA Margin & 15.6\% & 14.1\% & 13.8\% & 13.5\% & 13.0\% & 12.3\% & 12.0\% & 12.0\% & 10.7\% & 3.6\% & 13.0\% & \\
\hline (-) Depreciation \& Amortization & \$777 & \$835 & \$891 & \$886 & \$935 & \$939 & \$991 & \$966 & \$917 & \$874 & \$838 & \\
\hline Adj. EBIT & \$2,158 & \$1,890 & \$1,742 & \$1,689 & \$1,553 & \$1,369 & \$1,416 & \$1,465 & \$1,212 & -\$300 & \$1,680 & (22\%) \\
\hline EBIT Margin & 11.5\% & 9.8\% & 9.2\% & 8.9\% & 8.1\% & 7.3\% & 7.1\% & 7.2\% & 6.1\% & -1.9\% & 8.6\% & \\
\hline (-) Interest Expense & \$299 & \$327 & \$338 & \$339 & \$328 & \$308 & \$299 & \$257 & \$207 & \$284 & \$260 & \\
\hline Adj. EBT & \$1,859 & \$1,562 & \$1,404 & \$1,350 & \$1,225 & \$1,060 & \$1,117 & \$1,208 & \$1,005 & (\$584) & \$1,420 & (24\%) \\
\hline \% Growth & - & (16.0\%) & (10.1\%) & (3.8\%) & (9.3\%) & (13.5\%) & 5.4\% & 8.1\% & (16.8\%) & (158.1\%) & NM & \\
\hline EPS & \$4.30 & \$4.17 & \$4.05 & \$4.25 & \$4.00 & \$3.75 & \$4.18 & \$5.60 & \$4.87 & (\$2.27) & \$7.35 & 71\% \\
\hline \% Growth & - & (3.1\%) & (2.9\%) & 4.9\% & (5.9\%) & (6.3\%) & 11.5\% & 34.0\% & (13.0\%) & (146.6\%) & NM & \\
\hline Shares Outstanding (in thousands) & 271.0 & 236.8 & 219.5 & 204.3 & 194.5 & 179.3 & 168.0 & 165.3 & 158.0 & 155.0 & 148.3 & (45\%) \\
\hline Cash \& Cash Equivalents & \$1,205 & \$537 & \$971 & \$1,407 & \$707 & \$1,074 & \$1,308 & \$934 & \$723 & \$2,271 & \$1,587 & 32\% \\
\hline Long-Term Borrowings & \$2,141 & \$2,492 & \$2,792 & \$2,780 & \$2,792 & \$2,795 & \$2,797 & \$1,861 & \$1,856 & \$2,451 & \$1,910 & (11\%) \\
\hline
\end{tabular}

\section*{DESPITE GROSS MARGIN GROWTH FROM 2019, KOHL'S HAS STILL TRAILED RETAIL PEERS}
\begin{tabular}{|c|c|c|c|c|}
\hline & 2019 & FY 2020 & 2021 & 2021 vs. 2019 (bps) \\
\hline & FY 2019 & 2020 & FY 2021 & FY E/A \\
\hline AEO & 35.3\% & 30.5\% & 39.7\% & 437 \\
\hline BBBY & 33.3\% & 33.6\% & 33.2\% & (6) \\
\hline BKE & 41.9\% & 44.5\% & 50.4\% & 847 \\
\hline BURL & 41.8\% & 38.2\% & 41.7\% & (8) \\
\hline CTRN & 38.0\% & 39.8\% & 41.4\% & 339 \\
\hline DDS & 32.6\% & 28.6\% & 42.9\% & 1,030 \\
\hline DKS & 29.3\% & 31.8\% & 38.3\% & 899 \\
\hline GPS & 37.6\% & 34.1\% & 39.8\% & 222 \\
\hline HIBB & 32.4\% & 35.8\% & 38.2\% & 580 \\
\hline JWN & 33.2\% & 29.0\% & 35.1\% & 190 \\
\hline M & 38.2\% & 29.2\% & 38.9\% & 67 \\
\hline PLCE & 35.0\% & 26.9\% & 41.6\% & 657 \\
\hline ROST & 28.1\% & 21.5\% & 27.5\% & (57) \\
\hline TGT & 28.9\% & 28.4\% & 28.3\% & (60) \\
\hline TJX & 28.5\% & 23.7\% & 28.5\% & 4 \\
\hline URBN & 31.1\% & 25.0\% & 32.8\% & 174 \\
\hline WSM & 36.3\% & 39.0\% & 44.0\% & 770 \\
\hline Retail Peer Average & 34.2\% & 31.7\% & 37.8\% & 358 \\
\hline Retail Peer Median & 33.3\% & 30.5\% & 38.9\% & 222 \\
\hline Retail Peer Reported Avg. & & & & 316 \\
\hline KSS & 35.7\% & 31.1\% & 38.1\% & 238 \\
\hline
\end{tabular}

\section*{summary of Kohl's' And peers' Leverage}
\begin{tabular}{|c|c|c|c|c|c|c|c|c|c|c|c|c|c|c|c|c|c|c|c|c|}
\hline (Dollars in Millions) & & KSS
Current
2021 & KSS w/SLB 2021 & AEO
2021 & BBBY

2021 & \[
\begin{aligned}
& \hline \text { BKE } \\
& 2021
\end{aligned}
\] & BURL

2021 & \[
\begin{aligned}
& \hline \text { CTRN } \\
& 2021
\end{aligned}
\] & DDS
2021 & DKS
2021 & GPS
2021 & HIBB

2021 & JWN
2021 & M
2021 & PLCE

2021 & \begin{tabular}{l} 
ROST \\
\hline 2021
\end{tabular} & TGT

2021 & TJX
2021 & \begin{tabular}{l}
URBN \\
2021
\end{tabular} & WSM
2021 \\
\hline Finance lease and financing obligations & & 2,251 & 6,451 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 44 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 2 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 2,075 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\
\hline Long-term debt & & 1,910 & 1,910 & 341 & 1,180 & 0 & 1,541 & 0 & 321 & 1,931 & 1,484 & 0 & 2,853 & 3,295 & 50 & 2,452 & 11,568 & 3,355 & 0 & 0 \\
\hline Total debt & & 4,161 & 8,361 & 341 & 1,180 & 0 & 1,585 & 0 & 321 & 1,931 & 1,484 & 2 & 2,853 & 3,295 & 50 & 2,452 & 13,643 & 3,355 & 0 & 0 \\
\hline Operating leases & & 2,624 & 2,624 & 1,465 & 1,855 & 288 & 2,898 & 216 & 43 & 2,579 & 4,767 & 281 & 1,798 & 3,098 & 226 & 3,170 & 8,591 & 9,152 & 1,187 & 1,284 \\
\hline Total debt (including operating leases) & & 6,785 & 10,985 & 1,806 & 3,034 & 288 & 4,483 & 216 & 364 & 4,510 & 6,251 & 283 & 4,651 & 6,393 & 276 & 5,622 & 22,234 & 12,507 & 1,187 & 1,284 \\
\hline Less: Operating lease, finance lease, and financing obligation liabilities & & \((4,875)\) & \((9,075)\) & \((1,465)\) & \((1,855)\) & (288) & \((2,942)\) & (216) & (43) & \((2,579)\) & \((4,767)\) & (283) & \((1,798)\) & \((3,098)\) & (226) & \((3,170)\) & \((10,666)\) & \((9,152)\) & \((1,187)\) & \((1,284)\) \\
\hline Add: Cash-based lease equivalent debt (a) & 8.0x & 4,650 & 6,890 & 3,695 & 4,372 & 965 & 5,266 & 517 & 181 & 5,541 & 11,008 & 702 & 1,832 & 3,256 & 1,227 & 7,050 & 4,512 & 26,339 & 2,151 & 3,078 \\
\hline Adjusted debt & & 6,560 & 8,800 & 4,036 & 5,552 & 965 & 6,807 & 517 & 502 & 7,472 & 12,492 & 702 & 4,685 & 6,551 & 1,277 & 9,502 & 16,080 & 29,694 & 2,151 & 3,078 \\
\hline Adjusted EBITDA & & 2,518 & 2,518 & 770 & 197 & 356 & 1,051 & 100 & 1,331 & 2,357 & 1,414 & 264 & 1,029 & 3,320 & 347 & 2,694 & 11,970 & 5,381 & 512 & 1,649 \\
\hline Rent expense (excludes lease expense) & & 298 & 298 & 462 & 547 & 121 & 658 & 65 & 23 & 693 & 1,376 & 88 & 229 & 407 & 153 & 881 & 564 & 3,292 & 269 & 385 \\
\hline Adjusted EBITDAR & & 2,816 & 2,816 & 1,232 & 744 & 476 & 1,709 & 165 & 1,353 & 3,050 & 2,790 & 352 & 1,258 & 3,727 & 500 & 3,575 & 12,534 & 8,673 & 780 & 2,034 \\
\hline Adjusted debt to adjusted EBITDAR & & 2.3x & 3.1x & 3.3x & 7.5x & 2.0x & 4.0x & 3.1x & 0.4x & 2.4x & 4.5x & 2.0x & 3.7x & 1.8x & 2.6x & 2.7x & 1.3x & 3.4x & 2.8x & 1.5x \\
\hline Cash & & 1,587 & 1,587 & 435 & 440 & 267 & 1,091 & 50 & 717 & 2,643 & 877 & 17 & 322 & 1,712 & 55 & 4,922 & 5,911 & 6,227 & 670 & 850 \\
\hline Adjusted net debt & & 4,973 & 7,213 & 3,602 & 5,113 & 699 & 5,716 & 467 & -215 & 4,828 & 11,615 & 685 & 4,363 & 4,839 & 1,222 & 4,579 & 10,169 & 23,467 & 1,481 & 2,227 \\
\hline Adjusted net debt to adjusted EBITDAR & & 1.8x & 2.6x & 2.9x & 6.9x & 1.5x & 3.3x & 2.8x & -0.2x & 1.6x & 4.2x & 1.9x & 3.5x & 1.3x & 2.4x & 1.3x & 0.8x & 2.7x & 1.9x & 1.1x \\
\hline
\end{tabular}

KOHL'S ONCE CLAIMED SHORT-LIVED OUTPERFORMANCE VERSUS ITS DEPARTMENT STORE PEER GROUP


IS KOHL'S' STRATEGIC PLAN (-6\%) \({ }^{1}\) RESPONSIBLE FOR DILLARD'S' (+241\%) AND MACY'S' (+53\%) RECENT OUTPERFORMANCE, TOO?

\section*{ANOTHER WASTED YEAR}

One year after Macellum first ran a campaign highlighting the Board's inability to create value, the Company's shares have continued to significantly underperform its retail peers


\section*{ANOTHER YEAR OF FINANCIAL UNDERPERFORMANCE}

Kohl's' shares have underperformed relevant peers and indices over every applicable time horizon

1-YEAR


3-YEAR


PRE-COVID (12/31/2019)


5-YEAR


\section*{GAINS IN SALES PER SQ. FT. TRAILED PEERS}


Sales Per Sq. Ft Growth 2011-2021

\section*{ADDITIONAL "GREATNESS AGENDA" DETAILS}
- Ms. Gass, designed the "Greatness Agenda" to be a three-year plan to get Kohl's back on track, but in 2017, sales were 4\% below the financial goals, operating profit was \(26 \%\) below targets
- Nearly a decade later and the Company has still yet to achieve the financial goals outlined in the "Greatness Agenda"
- Additionally, the Company has lowered long-term operating margins targets to 100-200 basis points below the goal outlined in the "Greatness Agenda"


WITHOUT CHANGE TO THE BOARD AND THE SAME CEO WHO DESIGNED THE "GREATNESS AGENDA," WHY SHOULD INVESTORS BELIEVE KOHL'S WILL MEET ITS FINANCIAL GOALS THIS TIME?

\section*{ADDITIONAL "GREATNESS AGENDA DETAILS" SAME STORY, DIFFERENT YEAR (CONT.)}

In October 2014, Kohl's announced its "Greatness Agenda," which was in place for \(\qquad\)


In October 2020, Kohl's announced a "new" strategic plan and tried to convince shareholders it was finally back on track.

Similarly in March 2022, Kohl's announced its "reinvention."
Unfortunately, we've heard this story before. Most of the current initiatives are strikingly similar to the prior ones from the failed "Greatness Agenda," including:
- Growing top line with the addition of new national brands and partnerships while developing a better assortment
- Reignite growth in the women's business
- Increasing gross margins
- Increasing inventory turns to drive better sales, gross margins and cash flow
- Driving traffic with new outside partnerships
- Fixing the overly complex loyalty programs


Once again, the "new" strategy is long on platitudes and short on real targets and quantifiable initiatives

\section*{ADDITIONAL "GREATNESS AGENDA" DETAILS SAME STORY, DIFFERENT YEAR (CONT.)}


2014
- "Expanding brand portfolio"
- "Inventory optimization"
- "Destination for the Active and Wellness Lifestyle"


2020
- "Brand portfolio reinvention"
- "Inventory management"
- "Retailer of choice for the active and casual lifestyle"


2022
- "Enhanced brand portfolio"
- "Inventory management"
- "Evolving to a focused active and casual lifestyle concept"
"Kohl's, in the mind of the customer, has always been a casual brand, and over the last five years we've also proven we can be a credible player in the active business as well. So now we are evolving the entire Kohl's brand proposition to stand for the active and casual lifestyle."
Michelle Gass, CEO (March 7, 2022)

\section*{ADDITIONAL "GREATNESS AGENDA" SAME STORY, DIFFERENT YEAR (CONT.)}

DETAILS

\section*{Kohl's has persistently failed to meet objectives laid out in its "Greatness Agenda"}
- In October 2014, Kohl's announced the "Greatness Agenda" at its Investor Conference, which focused on five key pillars
- Very quickly, the agenda ran into issues, and it became clear that Kohl's would not meet its set goals
- In 2015 Kohl's announced a new "evolution" to the plan as "an acknowledgment that the current plan needs tweaking"1
- However, Kohl's continued to fail against the initiatives outlined by the Greatness Agenda, which is especially disappointing given now CEO Michelle Gass was the architect of the Greatness Agenda.


October 2014
©he (Washington plost
Even with a 'Greatness Agenda, Kohl's is struggling to attract new shoppers


August 2015

11 Kohl's unveiled the

Agenda," ... Despite these efforts, Kohl's reported surprisingly weak quarterly earnings Thursday, raising questions about whether its turnaround strategy is living up to its name.


\section*{(D) RETAIL DIVE}

How great is Kohl's 'Greatness Agenda'?

...But that turnaround is failing to produce the kind of results that investors can comfortably live with.

\section*{ANOTHER EXAMPLE OF SPLIT SHIPMENTS}
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[^0]:    Source: Company SEC Filings, Bloomberg LP.
    (1) Same operating assumptions as midpoint but with flat sales growth vs. low single digits sales growth.
    (2) Recent offer price highlighted by Reuters.

[^1]:    Example provided by top tier investment bank

[^2]:    Source: Company SEC filings; Bloomberg LP, 2022E are based on Bloomberg LP 2022 Consensus Estimates.

[^3]:    Source: Company SEC Filings, Company Transcripts, Bloomberg LP

[^4]:    
    Note: 1: FY1 Refers to the current 1-year forecast, as of 01/14/2022 2. FY2 Refers to the current 2-year forecast, as of 01/14/2022. Current Valuation was as of 01/14/2022.

[^5]:    66
    George has been an instrumental board member with his capital markets experience and savvy insight. His understanding of both private and public markets has a great help to our company's strategic plans.

[^6]:    Michael Shaffer, COO and CFO of PVH Corp. (NYSE: PVH)

