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9		
10	LINITED STATES	DISTRICT COURT
11		CT OF CALIFORNIA
12	CENTRAL DISTRI	CI OF CALIFORNIA
13	CEEDITEN I CLOODECK	C N 225 02700 AD CK
14	STEPHEN J. CLOOBECK, an individual,	Case No. 2:25-cv-03790-AB-SKx
15	5 Plaintiff and	Hon. André Birotte Jr.
16	Counterdefendant,	NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON
17	VS.	THE PLEADINGS OF DEFENDANTS AND
18	ANTONIO R. VILLARAIGOSA, an individual; ANTONIO	COUNTERCLAIMANTS ANTONIO R. VILLARAIGOSA
	VILLARAIGOSA FOR GOVERNOR 2026, a non-profit political	AND ANTONIO VILLARAIGOSA FOR GOVERNOR 2026
20	organization; and DOES 1-10, inclusive,	MEMORANDUM OF POINTS
21	Defendants and	AND AUTHORITIES
22	Counterclaimants.	[Request for Judicial Notice, [Proposed] Order Thereon Lodged Concurrently Herewith]
23		Date: July 11, 2025
24		Date: July 11, 2025 Time: 10:00 a.m. Courtroom: 7B
25		Action Filed: April 29, 2025 Trial Date: None Set
26		I That Date: None Set
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TO ALL PARTIES AND THEIR COUNSEL OF RECORD:

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PLEASE TAKE NOTICE THAT on July 11, 2025, at 10:00 a.m., or as soon thereafter as this matter may be heard, in the courtroom of the Honorable André Birotte Jr., located in the United States Courthouse, 350 West First Street, Los Angeles, California, Defendants and Counterclaimants Antonio R. Villaraigosa and Antonio Villaraigosa for Governor 2026 ("Defendants") will and hereby do move this Court, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c), for an order granting judgment on the pleadings (the "Motion").

This Motion is made upon the grounds that: (i) as a matter of law, Mr. Cloobeck's lawsuit must be dismissed because the Lanham Act does not apply to political speech; (ii) dismissal is required because trademark law is confined to commercial goods or services; (iii) compounding the inapplicability of trademark law to political speech, the First Amendment bars any application of the Lanham Act that would burden political speech; (iv) the facts and circumstances here underscore the free speech limitations presented by—and the perverse consequences that would attach to—Mr. Cloobeck's claims if not promptly dismissed; (v) frequent, previous uses of the phrase at issue underscore the incompatibility of Mr. Cloobeck's lawsuit with the First Amendment; (vi) Mr. Cloobeck's trademark application reveals the true purpose of the protection he seeks: promoting public awareness of himself as a candidate for public office; (vii) the relief sought by Mr. Cloobeck reveals the extent of the First Amendment violation he invites in attempting to muzzle Mr. Villaraigosa's political speech; (viii) Mr. Cloobeck seeks to tilt an election in his favor by stifling debate and disguising the truth about which candidate has a record of proven problem solving; and (ix) Mr. Cloobeck seeks by these proceedings to force a drain on his political opponent's campaign funds.

This Motion is based on the accompanying Memorandum of Points and Authorities, Request for Judicial Notice, the Declaration of Eric M. George filed concurrently herewith, all of the pleadings, files, and records in this proceeding, all

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1	other matters of which the Court may take judicial notice, and any argument or				
2	evidence that may be presented to or considered by the Court prior to its ruling.				
3	This Motion is made following the conference of counsel pursuant to L.R. 7-				
4	3, which took place on May 1	13, 2025.			
5					
6	DATED: June 4, 2025	ELLIS GEORGE LLP			
7		Eric M. George			
8		Keith J. Wesley Christopher W. Arledge			
9					
10					
11		By: s/Eric M. George			
12		Eric M. George Attorney for Defendants and			
13		Counterclaimants Antonio R. Villaraigosa			
14		and Antonio Villaraigosa for Governor 2026			
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MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

I. <u>INTRODUCTION</u>

By this lawsuit—an unfortunate "first"—plaintiff Stephen Cloobeck seeks to tilt the 2026 California gubernatorial election in his favor by preventing another candidate from using the commonly-employed phrase "proven problem solver."

Such a gambit, based solely on a pending but undecided trademark application, is anathema not only to federal trademark law and the First Amendment, but to that other candidate—Antonio Villaraigosa, who formerly served both as Los Angeles mayor and as Speaker of the State Assembly, and who now brings this motion for judgment on the pleadings (the "Motion").

As Mr. Villaraigosa now demonstrates, Mr. Cloobeck's lawsuit misunderstands fundamental principles of constitutional and federal law by:

- attempting to wield trademark law against political speech, despite trademark law's application solely to commercial goods and services;
- burdening the First Amendment rights of Mr. Villaraigosa and other candidates who seek to engage in robust free speech in an election contest; and
- trying to monopolize a common phrase which scores of politicians have used long before the parties herein, and which must remain available to all candidates seeking office in a constitutional democracy.

These legal derelictions have not, unfortunately, restrained Mr. Cloobeck from filing suit in order to achieve what we believe his agenda to be:

- shielding himself from ongoing public debate whether he is a problem creator (not solver), and the personal nature of such problems he has created; and
- forcing Mr. Villaraigosa to expend precious campaign funds to defend against Mr. Cloobeck's lawsuit.

For these reasons, as set forth more fully below, we respectfully seek dismissal of Mr. Cloobeck's lawsuit without leave to amend, and intend to seek reimbursement of all incurred fees and costs following such dismissal.

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II. THE ALLEGATIONS / FACTUAL RECORD BEFORE THIS COURT

As alleged in Mr. Cloobeck's complaint:

- He and Mr. Villaraigosa "are candidates for Governor of California" (RFJN, Ex. 1 at ¶ 1);
- "In connection with [his] campaign," Mr. Cloobeck "has been using the trademark 'I AM A PROVEN PROBLEM SOLVER' . . . , which is subject to U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 98899658" (*ibid.*);
- Mr. Villaraigosa and his campaign—defendant "Antonio Villaraigosa for Governor 2026, a non-profit political organization" (*id.* at caption, ¶6)—are engaged in the "pervasive and unrelenting use of a confusingly similar trademark 'PROVEN PROBLEM SOLVER'... in connection with Villaraigosa's campaign" (*id.* at ¶2); and
- Mr. Villaraigosa and his campaign "have aimed solely at unfairly competing with Plaintiff by displaying and marketing the Infringing Mark." (*Ibid.*)

In response to the complaint, Mr. Villaraigosa and his campaign have answered, admitting to using the phrase "proven problem solver" in connection with the campaign. (RFJN, Ex. 2 at ¶20.)

Apart from the pleadings, and to furnish the Court with additional, judicially-noticeable facts relevant to the adjudication of this Motion, Defendants have concurrently lodged a Request for Judicial Notice that:

- Identifies, with citations, instances over the past several decades in which the phrase "proven problem solver" has been employed in connection with political campaigns (RFJN, Ex. 3); and
- Attaches litigation filings from and about Mr. Cloobeck—not for the truth of their contents, but to identify already-public topics that may be debated in the course of the impending gubernatorial campaign. (RFJN, Exs. 4-11.)

III. LEGAL ARGUMENT

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A. The Court Should Dismiss Mr. Cloobeck's Fatally-Defective **Lawsuit Without Leave To Amend**

This Motion, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c), should be granted without leave to amend, as "the complaint could not be saved by any amendment." Sonoma Cnty. Ass'n of Retired Emps. v. Sonoma Cnty., 708 F.3d 1109, 1118 (9th Cir. 2013). See also Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c) ("After the pleadings are closed—but early enough not to delay trial—a party may move for judgment on the pleadings.").

B. As A Matter of Law, Mr. Cloobeck's Lawsuit Must Be Dismissed **Because The Lanham Act Does Not Apply To Political Speech**

Dismissal Is Required Because Trademark Law Is Confined 1. **To Commercial Goods Or Services**

In seeking to limit a political opponent's speech in connection with California's 2026 gubernatorial contest, Mr. Cloobeck misunderstands the limited, commercial scope of federal trademark law, specifically the Lanham Act, which "prohibits conduct that would confuse consumers as to the origin, sponsorship, or approval of goods or services." OTR Wheel Eng'g, Inc. v. W. Worldwide Servs., *Inc.*, 897 F.3d 1008, 1013 (9th Cir. 2018).

Trademark law will not countenance a supposed holder's effort to arrogate to himself only—and to silence others from using—supposedly trademark-protected words in a non-commercial context. Illustrative is *Think Rubix*, *LLC v. Be Woke*.

Even where a commercial / noncommercial distinction is blurred—and here it is not, as Mr. Cloobeck's complaint concedes he "has been using the trademark . . . [i]n connection with [his] campaign" (RFJN, Ex. 1 at ¶1)—courts within this Circuit have expeditiously dismissed trademark actions at the pleading stage. See, e.g., Destefani v. Ubisoft Ent., 2022 WL 649262, at *5-6 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 10, 2022) (dismissing trademark claims at pleading stage and without leave to amend because First Amendment protected use of plaintiff's name and related trademarks in video

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27 28 game); Jackson v. Netflix Inc., 506 F. Supp. 3d 1007, 1016-17 (C.D. Cal. 2020) (dismissing trademark claims at pleading stage and without leave to amend based on First Amendment protection of use of "Tiger King" in title and content of documentary).

Vote, 2022 WL 1750969 at *3 (E.D. Cal. May 31, 2022), in which owners of the trademark "WOKE VOTE" sued over the mark "Be Woke. Vote" to promote their political engagement efforts and their sale of goods and services. Dismissing the action without leave to amend, the district court held the defendants' use of the allegedly infringing phrase was "inherently intertwined with their efforts to inform and persuade the public on social and political issues." (Ibid.) Even though the "plaintiff ha[d] a valid trademark covering the services in which the parties are engaged," the district court held the Lanham Act inapplicable, given "the fundamentally noncommercial nature of the services places the defendants' actions within the exception to the Lanham Act." (*Ibid.*)

Think Rubix, LLC is merely a recent application of well-established jurisprudence identifying and explaining why litigation efforts such as Mr. Cloobeck's are doomed at the outset:

It is important that trademarks not be 'transformed from rights against unfair competition to rights to control language.' Mark A. Lemley, The Modern Lanham Act and the Death of Common Sense, 108 Yale L.J. 1687, 1710-11 (1999). Such a transformation would diminish our ability to discuss the products or criticize the conduct of companies that may be of widespread public concern and importance. See id. 'Much useful social and commercial discourse would be all but impossible if speakers were under threat of an infringement lawsuit every time they made reference to a person, company or product by using its trademark.' New Kids on the Block v. News America Publ'g, *Inc.*, 971 F.2d 302, 307 (9th Cir. 1992). The [lower court's]

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injunction broadly removes most of the speech on the web site. By redacting purely editorial and historical comments, the injunction is not narrowly tailored. The Constitution will not tolerate such a wholesale suppression of speech.

CPC Int'l, Inc. v. Skippy Inc., 214 F.3d 456, 462 (4th Cir. 2000).

Precisely so here. Mayor Villaraigosa's speech is not commercial. He is not selling goods and services. He is seeking to earn votes. And while Mr. Cloobeck may be in competition for those votes, trademark law will not assist him. *See Bosley Med. Inst., Inc. v. Kremer*, 403 F.3d 672, 676-77 (9th Cir. 2005) (citing *Prestonettes, Inc. v. Coty*, 264 U.S. 359, 368 (1924)) ("A trade-mark only gives the right to prohibit the use of it so far as to protect the owner's good will against the sale of another's product as his.") (emphasis removed).

2. Compounding The Inapplicability Of Trademark Law To Political Speech, The First Amendment Bars Any Application Of The Lanham Act That Would Burden Political Speech

In attempting to prevent a political opponent from using a commonlyemployed phrase in a campaign for elective office, Mr. Cloobeck's lawsuit impermissibly burdens First Amendment protected speech.

"If speech is not 'purely commercial'—that is, if it does more than propose a commercial transaction—then it is entitled to full First Amendment protection." *Think Rubix, LLC*, 2022 WL at *3 (quoting *Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Recs., Inc.*, 296 F.3d 894, 906 (9th Cir. 2002) and *Hoffman v. Cap. Cities/ABC, Inc.*, 255 F.3d 1180, 1185-86 (9th Cir. 2001)). "Even if there is a risk of public confusion regarding the two marks, the defendants' speech is nonetheless protected." *Ibid. See also Taubman Co. v. Webfeats*, 319 F.3d 770, 775 (6th Cir. 2003) ("as per the language of the Lanham Act, any expression embodying the use of a mark not 'in connection with the sale . . . or advertising of any goods or services,' and not likely

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to cause confusion, is outside the jurisdiction of the Lanham Act and necessarily protected by the First Amendment").

As if in contemplation of the very issue presented here, the Supreme Court in *Buckley v. Valeo*, 424 U.S. 1, 14-15 (1976) (*per curium*) conclusively explained why litigants such as Mr. Cloobeck may not enlist the courts in an effort to muzzle an opposing political candidate's speech:

Discussion of public issues and debate on the qualifications of candidates are integral to the operation of the system of government established by our Constitution. The First Amendment affords the broadest protection to such political expression in order 'to assure (the) unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing about of political and social changes desired by the people.' Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957). Although First Amendment protections are not confined to 'the exposition of ideas,' Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 510 (1948), 'there is practically universal agreement that a major purpose of that Amendment was to protect the free discussion of governmental affairs of course includ(ing) discussions of candidates. . . . ' Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218 (1966). This no more than reflects our 'profound national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open,' New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964). In a republic where the people are sovereign, the ability of the citizenry to make informed choices among candidates for office is essential, for the identities of those who are elected will inevitably shape the course that we follow as a nation. As the Court observed in Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S. 265, 272 (1971), 'it can hardly be doubted that the constitutional guarantee has its fullest and most urgent application precisely to the conduct of campaigns for political

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l office.'

C. The Facts And Circumstances Here Underscore The Free Speech Limitations Presented By—And The Perverse Consequences That Would Attach To—Mr. Cloobeck's Claims If Not Promptly Dismissed

As explained below, the incompatibility of Mr. Cloobeck's lawsuit with the First Amendment is underscored by (1) the frequent, historical uses of the "proven problem solver" phrase by and about so very many individuals seeking to become officeholders since at least as far back as 1989; (2) Mr. Cloobeck's bald admission, in the course of an attempt to hoard for himself more than 75 trademarks, that he seeks federal trademark protection for "[p]olitical campaign services, namely, promoting public awareness of [himself as] a candidate for public office" (RFJN. Ex. 1, at Page ID #14 [Trademark Application]); (3) the relief Mr. Cloobeck's complaint seeks, which would impede Mr. Villaraigosa's ability to engage in political speech; (4) a practical assessment of how Mr. Cloobeck's actions seek to tilt the playing field in the 2026 gubernatorial election; and (5) the drain on a political opponent's funds that the mere pendency of Mr. Cloobeck's lawsuit necessarily achieves.

1. Frequent, Previous Uses Of The Phrase At Issue Underscore The Incompatibility Of Mr. Cloobeck's Lawsuit With The First Amendment

The First Amendment protections offended by Mr. Cloobeck's lawsuit are especially pronounced given the frequent uses of the "proven problem solver" phrase in political contexts. Such circumstances render it inconceivable that, after the several decades in which politicians have used these words, Mr. Cloobeck may invoke legal process to monopolize that phrase for exclusive use for himself and prevent its use by others in political contexts.

A cursory search demonstrates the frequent use, starting at least as far back as

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1989, of Mr. Cloobeck's purported mark. Even confined to the context of political campaigns, candidates for decades have referred to themselves—or to others whom they have endorsed—as "proven problem solvers." The accompanying Compendium (see RFJN, Ex. 3²), by memorializing instances in which the phrase has been employed, highlights the phrase's seemingly ubiquitous use in political contexts, as well as its increased frequency of usage the closer one comes to the present.

We reference here just some of the phrase's early uses:

	Statement Date	Statement	Citation
1	August 17, 1989	"He's the proven problem- solver whom governors and mayors have turned to with problems that resist conventional solutions." — Citizens Committee for Ravitch (Richard Ravitch); Lieutenant Governor of New York	Everybody knows Dick Ravitch would be the best mayor, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 17, 1989, at B11.
2	February 7, 1990	"Garamendi termed himself a 'proven problem solver' and said that if elected he will work on four major challenges he sees facing California's first elected insurance commissioner next January" – John Garamendi, US House Member, California	Kenneth Reich, Garamendi Intends to Run for State Insurance Post, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 7, 1990, at OCA3, A22.

We do not mean to suggest the Compendium has captured all such reported uses of the phrase in a political context. There may be plenty more instances in which the phrase was used and reported in articles that do not appear on-line at the present, and there are surely multitudes of uses of the phrase in a political context that have simply not been reported.

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1		Statement Date	Statement	Citation
2 3	3	August 6, 2001	"Kelly Logan is a proven problem solver who is	Press Release, Pennsylvania Governor Ridge Nominates
4			committed to the DGS	Kelly Logan as Secretary of
5			mission to continually improve its service to its	General Services, PR NEWSWIRE, Aug. 6, 2001.
6			customers'" – Tom Ridge, 43 rd Governor of	
7			Pennsylvania	
8	4	December 20, 2001	"Harold is a proven problem	Roy Blunt, Member of U.S.
9		2001	solver." – Roy Blunt, US Senator, Missouri	House Representatives for Missouri, <i>Harold Bengsch</i>
10 11				Awarded 2001 Humanitarian of the Year
12				(December 20, 2001), CONGRESSIONAL RECORD:
13				PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES
14				OF THE 107 TH CONGRESS, FIRST SESSION, at E2387.
15	5	February 20,	"There's no denying	Tom Humphrey, U.S. Rep.
16		2002	Tennessee has problems and we need a proven problem-	Gordon Endorses Bredesen: [Final Edition],
17 18			solver to get us out of the mess and back on track'	KNOXVILLE NEWS-
19			." – Bart Gordon, US House	SENTINEL, at B2, Feb. 20, 2002.
20			Member, Tennessee	
21	6	September 8, 2003	" Peter is a proven problem-solver who can help	Scott Martelle, <i>THE STATE</i> / <i>THE RECALL</i>
22			save jobs and create more	CAMPAIGN; AD WATCH:
23			jobs."" – Peter Ueberroth, President of the United States	Peter V. Ueberroth; Peter Ueberroth's Campaign Has
24			Olympic Committee (via campaign materials)	Released Its First Television Advertisement, a 30-second
25			Campaign materials)	Spot that Campaign
26				Officials Say Will Begin Airing Statewide Today.
27				The Campaign Would Not
28				Disclose How Much It Will

1	Statement Date	Statement	Citation	
2			Spend on the	
3			Advertisement.: [HOME	
4			EDITION], L.A. TIMES, at A16, Sept. 8, 2003.	
5			1110, Sept. 0, 2000.	
6	2. Mr. Cloobeck's Trademark Application Reveals The True			
7	Purpose Of The Protection He Seeks: Promoting Public			
8	Awareness Of Himself As A Candidate For Public Office			
9	The First Amendment violation invited by Mr. Cloobeck's lawsuit has its			
10	origin in his trademark application—one of more than 75 applications he filed for			
11	myriad and, in many instances, commonplace phrases (see RFJN, Ex. 2 [Am.			

Answer] at Ex. 1 [List of Trademark Applications])—which brazenly reveals his intention to procure federal protection for the purpose of:

Political campaign services, namely, promoting public awareness of a candidate for public office; providing online information regarding political issues; ... providing a website that features political information from a candidate for political office in regards to the candidate's views on political issues. (RFJN, Ex. 1, at Page ID #14 [Trademark Application].)

3. The Relief Sought By Mr. Cloobeck Reveals The Extent Of **The First Amendment Violation He Invites In Attempting To** Muzzle Mr. Villaraigosa's Political Speech

Translated from legalese³, Mr. Cloobeck quite literally seeks from this Court

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Mr. Cloobeck's complaint's "Prayer for Relief" seeks, among other remedies:

[&]quot;[e]ntry of an order holding [Mr. Villaraigosa and his campaign] liable for infringement of [Mr. Cloobeck's 'I AM A PROVEN PROBLEM SOLVER'] 'Senior Mark'" (RFJN, Ex. 1, ¶1, p. 9, ¶A);

[&]quot;a preliminary and permanent" order "enjoin[ing] and restrain[ing]" r.

nothing less than:

- A ruling that Mr. Villaraigosa and his campaign have violated federal trademark law by Mr. Villaraigosa's use of the phrase PROVEN PROBLEM SOLVER;
- A restraint against Mr. Villaraigosa and his campaign from using, in the future, the phrase PROVEN PROBLEM SOLVER or similar language;
- A requirement that Mr. Villaraigosa and his campaign file a written report under oath describing compliance by Mr. Villaraigosa and his campaign with the foregoing;
- ordering the destruction by Mr. Villaraigosa and his campaign of all manner of paper and electronic materials; and

Villaraigosa and his campaign from "[u]sing any of [Mr. Cloobeck's] trademarks or any other trademark that is confusingly similar" (*id*.. p. 9, ¶B);

- "[e]ntry of an order requiring" Mr. Villaraigosa and his campaign "to file with this Court and serve upon [Mr. Cloobeck] . . . a written report under oath describing in detail the manner and form in which [Mr. Villaraigosa and his campaign] have complied with the injunction, including ceasing all use of [Mr. Cloobeck's] Senior Mark or the Infringing Mark [i.e., 'PROVEN PROBLEM SOLVER'] and removing all images of [Mr. Cloobeck's] Senior Mark or the Infringing Mark from websites controlled by [Mr. Villaraigosa and his campaign]" (id.. ¶2, p. 9, ¶C);
- "[e]ntry of an order requiring" Mr. Villaraigosa and his campaign "to deliver up for destruction all infringing materials, including all storage media, Internet webpages/scripts/html code, advertisements, brochures, current inventory of products, listings of services, articles, packages, wrappers, products, displays, labels, signs, vehicle displays or signs, circulars, kits, packaging, letterhead, business cards, promotional items . . . that contain infringing copies of [Mr. Cloobeck's] Senior Mark (id. pp. 9-10, ¶D); and
- "[a]n accounting against" Mr. Villaraigosa and his campaign, "and an award of monetary relief to [Mr. Cloobeck] in an amount to be fixed by the Court in its discretion, including . . . [a]ll actual, compensatory, consequential, and other damages, including pre- and post-judgment interest thereon at the highest lawful rate, suffered as a result of [Mr. Villaraigosa and his campaign's] trademark infringement." (*Id.*. p. 10, ¶E.)

• compelling Mr. Villaraigosa and his campaign to pay monetary damages to Mr. Cloobeck.

Positing a scenario in which such relief is granted more fully reveals the scope of the First Amendment violations Mr. Cloobeck invites: under Mr. Cloobeck's urged scenario, Mr. Villaraigosa would be violating a court order by describing himself as a "proven problem solver" in a press conference . . . in campaign literature . . . in response to a journalist's questions . . . or in a campaign debate.

To such draconian requests, Mr. Villaraigosa responds: *Not in this country*. *Not under our First Amendment—no matter the bullying or wealth used in an attempt to silence a candidate for elected office. And not in keeping with anything I have witnessed during my more than 30 years of public service—including as Mayor of Los Angeles and as Speaker of the Assembly.*

4. Mr. Cloobeck Seeks To Tilt An Election In His Favor By Stifling Debate And Disguising The Truth About Which Candidate Has A Record Of Proven Problem Solving

Mr. Cloobeck's lawsuit and the relief it seeks reveal, as a practical matter, an effort to tilt the 2026 gubernatorial election in his favor.

Procuring legal recognition—and court enforcement—of a trademark enabling him to identify and publicize himself⁴ as the sole "proven problem solver" among the 2026 gubernatorial race contestants would help Mr. Cloobeck inoculate against the renewal of public controversies that have dogged him. *See* RFJN, Exs. 4-11. This would be anathema to a robust and uncensored public debate over all candidates' qualifications, including such legitimate topics as:

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The filing of this litigation promptly generated press attention (*see e.g.*, RFJN, Ex. 12 ["Cloobeck sues Villaraigosa over use of the phrase 'proven problem solver'," *Los Angeles Times*, April 30, 2025]) associating Mr. Cloobeck with the phrase "proven problem solver."

- whether Mr. Cloobeck is a problem creator (not solver), as reflected in litigation filings associating him with problems of a personal nature (*see ibid.*⁵); and
- whether Mr. Villaraigosa—in stark contrast to the foregoing—has proven himself a problem solver in confronting preexisting societal problems—such as rising housing and living costs, joblessness, homelessness, crime, and education—throughout his tenure as a public servant, including as Los Angeles Mayor and as Speaker of the State Assembly.

5. Mr. Cloobeck Seeks By These Proceedings To Force A Drain On His Political Opponent's Campaign Funds

Mr. Cloobeck's actions have and will continue to force a drain on Mr. Villaraigosa's campaign coffers. No cynicism is required to recognize that in order

In connection with California's 2026 gubernatorial election, it would—and should—be "fair game" for voters to understand and debate publicly-available information concerning any candidate. To that end, no court should limit debate among candidates over who has the greater claim to be considered a "proven problem solver," including with respect to litigation that may shed light on a candidate's judgment or temperament.

By way of an example of such litigation, on January 8, 2021, Mr. Cloobeck sued Stefanie Gurzanski and four other parties, contending (among other allegations Mr. Cloobeck personally verified in pleadings) that (i) after having met Ms. Gurzanski the prior Summer, he had "given her property and experiences valued well in excess of \$1,300,000," based upon (ii) her alleged representations to him "that she was a legitimate fashion model . . . and that she desired a lifelong relationship with him," only to (iii) later conclude that "she is a professional pornographer" and "con artist." (RFJN, Ex. 4 at ¶¶1, 4.)

For her part, Ms. Gurzanksi averred that "[w]hen she woke up and realized what he was, and attempted to escape Cloobeck's predatory grasp, he lashed out and sought to punish Ms. Gurzanski [and] harassed, threatened, and abused Ms. Gurzanski, and boasted that with his wealth, his ability to hire armies of lawyers, and with his political contacts, he could bankrupt Ms. Gurzanski, her family and friends, ruin her hopes to become a resident of the United States, and ultimately ruin her life unless she came begging to Cloobeck for forgiveness and was willing to do his bidding." (*See id.*, Ex. 5 at ¶1.)

to defend against this lawsuit—which Mr. Villaraigosa endeavors to do without recourse to establishing a legal defense fund—he is being required to expend precious campaign funds.⁶ By that measure, Mr. Cloobeck has already succeeded. Following resolution of this case, we intend to move for reimbursement of all fees Mr. Villaraigosa and his campaign have been required to incur. **CONCLUSION** IV. For these reasons, Mr. Villaraigosa and his campaign respectfully request this Motion be granted and Mr. Cloobeck's case be dismissed without leave to amend. Mr. Cloobeck has admitted that he seeks to force a compromise allowing him the trademark protection he seeks over the contested phrase. On May 9, 2025, Mr. Cloobeck texted Mr. Villaraigosa that absent a "compr[om]ise" by which "[Mr.]Villaraigosa agrees to switch his campaign slogan from 'proven problem solver' to, simply, 'problem solver'" that Mr. Cloobeck was "prepared to fight [this matter] to the Supreme Court of the United States '[w]hich has been my consistent business practice for decades upon decades." (RFJN, Ex. 2 at ¶2.) There is ample reason to take Mr. Cloobeck at his word in so describing his "business practice." In pursuing his claims against a former paramour (see above at fn. 5), after having allegedly "boasted that with his wealth, his ability to hire armies

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Cloobeck v. Gurzanski, Case No. 2:21-cv-02306-FLA-DFM (C.D. Cal.),

commenced March 16, 2021; (iii) Gurzanski v. Cloobeck, Case No. B315025, commenced by Mr. Cloobeck, August 23, 2021; (iv) Cloobeck v. Sup. Ct. of Los

Angeles Cty, Case No. B314752, commenced Sept. 2, 2021; and (v) Cloobeck v.

Gurzanski, Case No. 2:21-cv-08212-GW-SP (C.D. Cal.), commenced Oct. 15,

of lawyers, and with his political contacts, he could bankrupt [the paramour]" (id., Ex. 5 at ¶1), Mr. Cloobeck filed three lawsuits against her (one state, two federal);

unsuccessfully petitioned for appellate writ relief; and noticed an appeal before the

state Court of Appeal. (See id., Exs. 6, 8-11 [Dockets for (i) Cloobeck v. Gurzanski, Los Angeles Superior Court, Case No. 21STCV00753, commenced Jan. 8, 2021; (ii)

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CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE The undersigned, counsel of record for Defendants and Counterclaimants Antonio R. Villaraigosa and Antonio Villaraigosa for Governor 2026, certifies that this brief contains 4,173 words, which: **■** complies with the word limit of L.R. 11-6.1. □ complies with the word limit set by court order dated _____ DATED: June 4, 2025 **ELLIS GEORGE LLP** Eric M. George Keith J. Wesley Christopher W. Arledge By: s/Eric M. George Eric M. George Attorney for Defendants and Counterclaimants Antonio R. Villaraigosa and Antonio Villaraigosa for Governor

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